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North American Oil Pollution:
Who is Liable for a
Canadian/American Catastrophe?
INTRODUCTION
In recent history, the United States and Canada have taken
decidedly different approaches to resolving oil pollution problems.'
The United States and Canada have revised their statutory re-
gimes in the wake of such oil catastrophes as the Torrey Canyon
incident,2 the Amoco Cadiz spill 3 and the Exxon Valdez spill. 4 The
1. The United States enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill. Canada follows the provisions of the Canada Shipping Act
as amended in 1989, which has implemented many of the provisions on the 1969
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.
2. The Torrey Canyon tanker crashed off the coast of England in 1967, result-
ing in a spill of over 29 million gallons of oil. This spill devastated the coastlines of
England and France. Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legis-
lation: When Good Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10333,
10334 (1989). The clean up costs for this oil spill were estimated to be in excess of
fifteen million dollars, which does not include the number of lawsuits that ensued
shortly thereafter. These lawsuits were settled for nearly seven million dollars,
but that amount represented only a fraction of the actual damage caused to these
two nations. See id. "The awakening of public concern over oil pollution began
with the Torrey Canyon disaster off the southwest coast of England on March 18,
1967. The cleanup problems and costs associated with that pollution incident
aroused previously indifferent public opinion to the hazards posed by the mass
transportation of oil." Thomas J. Wagner, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analy-
sis, 21 J. Mar. L. & Com. 569, 570 (1990). The response to this incident led to an
early divergence in the United States's domestic approach to oil-pollution legisla-
tion and the approach taken by international conventions.
3. Concern over the international limits was brought into sharp focus by
the Amoco Cadiz spill off the coast of France in March 1978. This inci-
dent, which involved the loss of 68 million gallons (six times the amount of
the Exxon Valdez spill), sharpened worldwide recognition that the inter-
national regime needed to be updated and the limits of liability increased
to meet the requirements of a major catastrophe.
Wagner, supra note 2, at 572. For a detailed look at the problems associated with
the international conventions, see Douglas A. Jacobsen & James D. Yellen, Oil
Pollution: The 1984 London Protocols and the AMOCO CADIZ, 15 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 467 (1984). Due to the severity of the crash, the Amoco Cadiz vessel was not
salvageable. See Jones, supra note 2, at 10337. The vessel was eventually blown
up and the entire sixty million gallons of oil were lost. The amount of damage
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United States has rejected the provisions of the International Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage5 because the
claims that initiated after the spill totaled an estimated two billion dollars. See id.
As was the case after the Torrey Canyon spill, many of these claims were settled
for far less than was necessary to adequately clean the spill.
Two years prior to the devastation of the Amoco Cadiz, the Liberian tanker
Argo Merchant crashed approximately twenty seven miles off the coast of Nan-
tucket Island. While grounded, the vessel leaked nearly nine million gallons of oil.
See id. at 10337. With two such severe oil spills happening in such a close time
span, and the wake of the Torrey Canyon incident, suspicions had arisen as to the
overall safety of oil transportation. See id.
4. On March 24, 1989, it became resoundingly clear that there was a need for
new oil pollution legislation. On that day, a 987-foot tank vessel named the Exxon
Valdez was headed for California from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Terminal at
Valdez, Alaska. The vessel ran aground on Bligh Reef, in Prince William Sound,
spilling approximately eleven million gallons of oil. See H.R. Rep. No. 242, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 31 (1989); James I. Crowley, In the Wake of the Exxon
Valdez: Charting the Course of Pilotage Regulation, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 165, 165-
66 (1991); Elizabeth R. Millard, Note, Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 331, 340-41 (1993).
5. In 1969 and 1971, the international community responded to the Amoco
Cadiz oil spill by creating what was the initial international oil spill laws. See
supra note 3; see also Beth Van Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed Reform
in United States Law, 22 Int'l Law. 319, 320-21 (1988) (addressing the various
changes that the Protocols would institute into the existing Convention and Fund).
These laws established international agreements through the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO). See Melissa Kness Cooney, Comment, The Stormy Seas
of Oil Pollution Liability: Will Protection and Indemnity Clubs Survive?, 16 Hous.
J. Int'l L. 343, 353 (1993). At this time the IMO agreed upon the 1969 Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45, and the 1971 International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Dam-
age (Fund), Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 284. The inter-
national convention involves the rights of coastal nations to take legal action when
a "maritime casualty outside of its territorial waters threatens oil pollution dam-
age to the state." Van Hanswyk, supra at 321. The international convention was
designed to incorporate "'.... uniform international rules and procedures for deter-
mining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation' for vessel
source oil pollution." Id. (quoting the CLC preamble). The CLC provided for liabil-
ity to shipowners in case of "tanker spills," in which cleanup, natural resource
damage, and third party claims were covered for up to a maximum of eighteen
million dollars. See Jones, supra note 2, at 10335. "The Fund Convention is a
companion to the CLC Convention and is financed by oil-receivers bringing the
total maximum compensation available to $78 million. Contributions from mem-
ber countries are based on the annual amount of oil received." Id. To be a member
of the Fund Convention, every country is required first to ratify the CLC Conven-
tion. The Fund provides compensation in the event that the oil pollution damages
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legislation inadequately satisfies the potential monetary sum in-
volved in the clean up and compensation for a spill of great magni-
tude.6 The United States responded to this inadequacy by
enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).7 Through this Act,
the United States attempted to incorporate an all encompassing oil
pollution legislation.
The 1989 amendments to the Canada Shipping Act s represent
the most recent Canadian response to the oil pollution scare.
These amendments altered the existing legislation by incorporat-
ing many provisions of the Civil Liability Convention. 9 Canada did
not ratify the Civil Liability Convention, but did use the language
of many of the provisions.
Canada adopted these changes to take on an international ap-
proach to the problem of oil pollution, whereas the United States
has decided to test the waters with a unilateral approach to the
problem.' 0 The goal of this comment is to analyze the current leg-
exceed those compensable under the CLC, and the CLC would provide compensa-
tion to victims not covered by the CLC. See id. (citing the CLC art. IV and V(1)).
6. See generally Millard, supra note 4 (describing the effects that the Exxon
Valdez spill had on the environment, and the introduction of the Oil Pollution Act).
If the U.S. Congress had implemented the conventions, then the international
agreements would have preempted state law. See Cooney supra note 5, at 353.
The preemption of state law was not the lone factor in Congress's decision not to
ratify the conventions. The main reason that the United States did not ratify the
conventions of 1969 (CLC) and 1971 (Fund) was because of the fear that the liabil-
ity limits were too low. See id. at 353-54; Van Hanswyk supra note 5, at 323; infra
text accompanying note 45; see also George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and
Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21 Envtl. L. 237, 324 (1991)
(stating that the IMO adopted the CLC and Fund Protocols in an attempt to ad-
dress the reservations that the United States and any other nation may have con-
cerning the "low" liability limits and other "inadequacies" with the 1969 CLC and
Fund Protocols).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2770 (1994).
8. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, §§ 673-728 (1985) (Can.).
9. See supra note 5. The new liability provisions are in Part XVI of the Can-
ada Shipping Act. See id. The amendments were enforced starting on April 24,
1989, the same date that Canada introduced the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (the Civil Liability Convention) and the Inter-
national Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (the Fund Convention).
See A.H.E. Popp, Q.C., A North American Perspective on Liability and Compensa-
tion for Oil Pollution Caused by Ships, in Liability for Damage to the Marine Envi-
ronment 109, 113 n.17 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993).
10. See Daniel Kopec & H. Philip Peterson, Note, Crude Legislation: Liability
and Compensation Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23 Rutgers L.J. 597 (1992).
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islation of these neighboring nations, and illustrate why a uniform
plan would be more efficient.
This comment will compare and contrast the differences in lia-
bility regimes between these neighboring countries. Part I will il-
lustrate the history of oil pollution legislation in both the United
States and Canada. Part II will involve a detailed look at both
countries's standards of liability, their defenses to liability and
their limits on liability. Part III will present a hypothetical ap-
proach to an oil spill that causes damage to both Canada and the
United States. Illustrating the routes currently taken by both
countries, Part IV will look at how these countries need to revise
their approach to oil pollution problems.
I. HISTORY
A. History of the United States Oil Pollution Legislation
The United States has enacted legislation regulating oil pollu-
tion for approximately one hundred years," and has enacted sev-
eral statutes in an attempt to cure inefficiencies in already existing
legislation.' 2
In 1851, the United States Congress enacted the Shipowner's
Limitation of Liability Act.13 In enacting this statute, Congress
sought to promote the shipping industry by allowing shipowners to
limit their liability in the event of an oil spill. The purpose of this
statute was to allow a shipper and certain charterers to limit their
liability to the 'post-accident' value of a vessel and its freight, 14 in
11. See The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121
(1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-467 (1986)). This legislation
was one of the earliest statutory enactments to regulate oil pollution in the United
States.
12. See The Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-437 (1924) (repealed
1970).
13. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1994).
14. See id. § 183(a). Section 183(a) of the statute states in relevant part:
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign,
for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property,
goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any
loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss,
damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or
knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount or
value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then
pending.
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the hopes that this would encourage the growth of the shipping
industry.15 The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 185116
has forced proceeding legislation to preempt the Act as the stan-
dard for liability. Because nations of the world have made environ-
mental protection a priority, the fault based liability regime of the
1851 Act has proved inadequate to remedy these needs. Conse-
quently, the United States has moved from a "fault based" liability
to a strict liability regime. 17 The changes in society's priorities
have caused a shift from a concentration on commerce incentives
toward overall environmental protection.' 8
The present day oil pollution legislation began with the enact-
ment of the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
(WQIA).19 The WQIA allowed for a broader recovery than previ-
15. See 23 Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 714 (1851).
16. 46 U.S.C §§ 181-195 (1994).
17. See Antonio J. Rodriguez, 3 Benedict on Admiralty § 111, 9-7 (1997).
18. This U.S. position has resulted from reaction or, possibly, overreac-
tion, to the Exxon Valdez disaster, one of the most serious and spectacular
marine accidents in recent history, which occurred in U.S. waters and
caused serious damage to U.S. coastal and marine environment. Direct
results of this reaction were the wholesale condemnation of the U.S. and
international shipping industries, especially tanker operations, the dis-
carding of international agreements, which the U.S. had been instrumen-
tal in establishing, and a new piece of draconian legislation in the form of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Edgar Gold, Marine Pollution Liability After "Exxon Valdez" The U.S. "All-Or-
Nothing" Lottery!, 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 423, 424-25 (1991).
What the Nation needs is a package of complementary international, na-
tional, and State laws that will adequately compensate victims of oil
spills, provide quick, efficient cleanup, minimize damage to fisheries, wild-
life and other natural resources and internalize those costs within the oil
industry and its transportation sector. Instead, there is a fragmented col-
lection of Federal and State laws providing inadequate cleanup and dam-
age remedies, taxpayer subsidies to cover cleanup costs, third party
damages that go uncompensated, and substantial barriers to victim recov-
eries-such as legal defenses, statutes of limitation, the corporate form,
and the burdens of proof that favor those responsible for the spill.
S. Rep. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
19. Water Quality Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (super-
seded by FWPCA as codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)). See Note, Oil
Spills and Cleanup Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1761 (1980) (discussing the levels of federal recovery and the proposed
changes in recovery legislation); see also Douglas Meiklejohn, Note, Liability for
Oil Pollution Cleanup and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 Cornell
L. Rev. 973 (1970) (discussing oil spill legislation prior to the Water Quality Im-
provement Act of 1970 and the inadequacies of the Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970).
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ously afforded from common law causes of action, and also limited
the use of the Limitation of Liability Act by creating strict liability
for oil pollution damages. 20 In 1972, Congress enacted what was
viewed at the time as a further improvement to oil pollution legis-
lation, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),21 which
in effect superseded the WQIA. The FWPCA (also known as the
Clean Water Act) forbade disposing oil into the navigable waters of
the United States, awarding civil compensation for any dis-
charges. 22 By providing for the cleanup of oil spills and authoriz-
ing the government to remove the spilled oil, after establishing
that the owner or operator of the vessel was not going to proceed
with clean up,23 the FWPCA continued the United States's trend
toward strict liability for discharging oil into the navigable waters
of the United States. Although the FWPCA addressed the recovery
costs that the Federal government would incur, it failed to address
the individual citizens' recovery costs. 24 The FWPCA did not
make the responsible party liable to anyone other than the United
States, and, even then, it was only liable for removal costs. 25 The
20. See Meiklejohn, supra note 19, at 974-75.
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994). The FWPCA was an attempt by Congress
to have a comprehensive and extensive plan to combat the inevitable problems
that accompany a significant oil spill. "The objective of this chapter is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters." Id. § 1251(a).
22. The FWPCA has had changes made to it, such as the Clean Water Act.
See Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). The Clean Water Act of 1977 in-
creased liability for vessels per tonnage, from $100 to $150 per ton, and also im-
posed a cap of $250,000 for removal costs. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1994).
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1).
24. The President may require the United States attorney of the district in
which the threat occurs to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such
threat; the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require. See id.
§ 1321(e). It appears from the language of the statute that individual citizens do
not have a cause of action against the liable party. Section 1321(e) states that if
there is actual or threatened discharge of oil from a vessel then it is the duty of the
Attorney General to secure relief, and not the duty of the individual citizens. See
id. Individual citizens could lose their opportunity to recover if the Fund is dried
up through the recovery claims of the government, or if the Attorney General fails
to secure funds for the individual citizens. See id.
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f), (g) (1994). The Act reads in relevant part:
(f)(1) Except where an owner or operator can prove that the discharge
was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on
the part of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a
third party without regard to whether any such act or omission was or
was not negligent, or any combination of the foregoing clauses, such
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FWPCA did provide limitation for oil spill liability, but the liability
provisions were considered far too lenient, and provided inade-
quate recovery for oil pollution damages.26
To compensate for the inadequacies left by the FWPCA, Con-
gress enacted geographically specific statutes to cover the potential
monetary and damage-related costs that would accompany an oil
spill. For example, in 1973, Congress enacted the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA). 27 TAPAA has jurisdiction
over spills that occur from vessels carrying oil from the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline to ports or facilities in the United States. 28
TAPAA imposes liability beyond that imposed by the FWPCA.29
Two more examples of present day oil-pollution legislation in-
clude the Deepwater Port Act (DWPA) and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments (OCSLA). The Deepwater Port Act
(DWPA)30 was implemented in 1974 to incorporate oil spills from
offshore oil facilities. 3 ' The DWPA imposes strict liability upon the
owner ... shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be liable to
the United States Government for the actual costs incurred ....
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
26. See S. Rep. No. 101-94, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
"The [FWPCA] ... has historically provided only partial protection. The Act sets
inappropriately low limits of liability for owners and operators of vessels with re-
spect to Federal oil spill removal costs and natural damages, and provides no cov-
erage or compensation for other damages." Id.
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
28. See id. TAPAA imposes strict liability upon the owner and operator of any
vessel under the Act, and affords some limited defenses. See id. § 1653(c)(1), (2),
(7). The defenses are act of war, negligence on the part of the United States or
another governmental agency, or if the claim is brought by a damaged party and
the negligence was caused by the damaged party. See id. § 1653(c)(2).
29. See Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
15 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 9 (1990). The Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
(TAPAA), the Deepwater Port Act (DWPA), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA) were all enacted by Congress to provide injured parties with oil pollu-
tion compensation beyond the amount of compensation that is provided by the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). See Glen Fjermedal, Comment,
Federal Oil Spill Fund Legislation: A Future Standard, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 161, 177-80
(1988). TAPAA allows for recovery beyond the clean up cost of governmental clean
up costs. See id. at 178-79. "The FWPCA does not pre-empt OCSLA or DWPA,
specifically stating that '[niothing in this section shall be construed to impose, or
authorize the imposition of, any limitation on liability' under OCSLA and DWPA."
Id. at 180 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1321(r) (1982)).
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1994).
31. Deepwater ports are defined as "any fixed or floating manmade structures
other than a vessel ... located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of the
United States... used or intended for use as a port or a terminal for the loading or
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owner and operator of vessels and offshore facilities.32 The DWPA
applies to those facilities off the coast of the United States, but not
those facilities that are producing oil from the "Outer Continental
Shelf."33 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978 (OCSLA) 34 regulate the discharge of oil from offshore facili-
ties or vessels that transport oil from an offshore facility on the
Outer Continental Shelf. Liability under OCSLA is strict, limited
only by the amount of oil carried by the vessel.3 5 Congress
amended OCSLA in 1978, primarily to encourage more rapid de-
velopment of the United States's "oil and gas resources and to pro-
tect against the increased risks to marine and coastal
environments posed by increased development."36 However, there
are still inadequacies which Congress attempted to remedy.
Congress's attempt to fix the inadequacies left by the enact-
ment of these various statutes created considerable confusion.
Each statute had its own separate liability provisions, limits on
liability, and established funds. In 1980, Congress tried to remedy
this confusion by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
unloading and further handling of oil for transportation to any State .... "Id.
§ 1502(10).
32. See id. § 1517(d) (1988) (repealed 1990) (holding the owners and operators
of vessels strictly, jointly, and severally liable). The owner or operator is afforded
the defenses of act of war or negligence of the United States government in estab-
lishing and maintaining aids in navigation, also the owner or the operator may
escape liability to a damaged party where he can show that the damage was
caused solely by the negligence of that party. See id. § 1517(g).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1502(10) (1994).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1820 (1988) (repealed 1990). "The term 'outer Continental
Shelf means all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and of which the
subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdic-
tion and control." 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1994).
35. See 43 U.S.C. § 1814(a), (c) (1988) (repealed 1990). The liability limits
under the Act are for vessels, $300 per gross ton, or $250,000 whichever is greater,
"except whenever the owner or operator ... fails or refuses to provide all reason-
able cooperation and assistance requested by the responsible Federal official in
furtherance of cleanup activities . . . " Id. § 1814(b).
36. Sidney A. Wallace & Temple L. Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They
Be Cleaned Up?, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1343, 1348 (1983) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1802 (Supp.
II 1978)). The OCSLA was devised to incorporate a process of exploration and de-
velopment of the Outer Continental Shelf "in order to achieve national economic
and energy policy goals, assure national security, reduce dependence on foreign
resources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments in world trade." 43
U.S.C. § 1802(1) (1994).
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sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).37 CERCLA
governs the discharge of hazardous substances other than petro-
leum, natural gas and any related products.3 8 CERCLA imposes
strict liability on the owner or operator of a vessel that transports
hazardous substances to a treatment facility in the United
States. 39 CERCLA provides for a wide range of recoverable dam-
ages to damaged parties, such as removal and remedial costs to the
United States, a state, or any other person, and including the re-
covery of damages for injury or destruction to natural resources.40
CERCLA limits the liability of vessels based on the type of vessel,
nature of the cargo, and the vessel's tonnage.41 Although Congress
accomplished its goal of uniformity when dealing with hazardous
substances, it failed to consolidate the gaps left in oil-pollution
legislation. 42
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). This legislation created the Superflmd, to
provide a comprehensive fund for the recovery costs of any environmental incident
from the discharge of hazardous substances other than petroleum, natural gas,
and related products. See id. § 9601(14)(F). The provisions of the FWPCA and the
Oil Pollution Act that are inconsistent with CERCLA are preempted by the corre-
sponding provisions in CERCLA. See id. § 9607(a) (declaring, under Section
9607(a)(4)(C), that CERCLA extends the governmental recovery provisions for a
discharge of hazardous substances beyond those found in other legislation).
38. See id. § 9601(14)(F). CERCLA also preempts any parts of the Clean
Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act to the extent that they are inconsistent. See
id. §9607(a).
39. See id. § 9607(a). CERCLA makes explicit that the owner or operator of a
vessel may not use the Limitation of Liability Act to limit its liability for any spill
in CERCLA jurisdiction or under maritime tort law. See id. § 9607(h). The drafted
legislation for the Act contained language that encompassed oil spills, but any oil
spill references were excluded from the final text of CERCLA. "Oil Pollution Desk
Book," the Environmental Law Reporter, Environmental Law Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C. at 3.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
41. See id. § 9607(c). This section states in pertinent part: "(1) Vessel carry-
ing a hazardous substance as cargo or residue-$300 per gross ton or $5,000,000
whichever is greater.
(2) Other vessels-$300 per gross ton or $500,000 which is greater.
(3) Incineration vessels or facilities-total of all response costs plus $50,000,000
limit for damages."
Id.
42. See David Ashley Bagwell, Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 62 Tul. L.
Rev. 433 (1988). "CERCLA, however, does not elbow FWPCA out of the petroleum
business because CERCLA expressly defines the term 'hazardous substance' to ex-
clude 'petroleum .. .'" Id. at 444 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982)); see also
Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 36, at 1350 (discussing CERCLA).
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Congress ceased its efforts to create a uniform and comprehen-
sive approach to oil pollution from 1970 to 1984, when much of the
international community adopted the 1984 Protocols to the Civil
Liability Convention (CLC) and the Fund Convention.43 The pri-
mary goals of these international agreements were to consolidate
existing statutory regimes and to adopt an international scheme.
To accomplish these goals, the international community decided
that a change was needed. By targeting those areas labeled inade-
quate by the United States,4 the international community decided
to make changes to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Li-
ability for Oil Pollution Damage as well as the 1971 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage. 45 The result of the efforts
is the 1984 Protocols to the CLC.
43. Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969, 23 I.L.M. 177 (CLC Protocol of 1984) reprinted in 15 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 613, 613-22 (1984); Protocol to Amend the International Conven-
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, 1971, 23 I.L.M. 195 (Fund Protocol of 1984) reprinted in 15 J. Mar. L.
& Com. 623, 623-33 (1984).
44. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
45. In 1969 and 1971, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation (IMO), adopted two conventions that addressed the problem of marine oil
pollution. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. These conventions are the
International Convention Relating to the Intervention on the High Seas in Cases
of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention), International Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,
Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, 970 U.N.T.S. 211; and the Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, re-
printed in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970). In 1984, the international community headed by the
IMO held a conference to revise the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund Conventions. These
revisions were to come in the form of amendments or protocols that would eventu-
ally raise the amount of compensation available under the conventions. The CLC
Protocol of 1984 significantly raised the liability limits for shipowners. "The limits
... were raised to three million units of account (approximately U.S. $4.06 million)
for vessels up to 5000 gross tons, with an additional 420 units of account (approxi-
mately U.S. $568) liability for each additional ton." Van Hanswyk, supra note 5, at
324 (citing the CLC Protocol art. VI). "Maximum liability under the CLC Protocol
is 59.7 million units of account (approximately U.S. $80.8 million). The ship-
owner's liability will be unlimited if it is shown that the damage resulted from the
shipowner's personal act done intentionally or recklessly." Id. at 324 (citing the
CLC Protocol art. VI(2)); see also Cooney, supra note 5, at 353-54 (discussing the
International Maritime Organization which established international
agreements).
Additional changes were made to the 1984 Fund Protocol to provide for a
greater amount of compensation per accident. The 1984 Fund Protocol raised the
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The United States was a driving force behind the drafting of
the Protocols.46 The United States believed that an international
approach to oil pollution was necessary, but demanded changes to
the 1969 CLC and 1971 Fund conventions before it would ratify
them.47 The other members to the 1984 Protocols understood that
the changes to the existing conventions would only be successful if
the United States were to ratify the 1984 Protocols.48 The United
States had one of the largest shipping fleets in the world, and with-
out ratification by the United States, the Protocols would not be
complete.
maximum of compensation to approximately $182.6 million per accident. See Pro-
tocol of 1984 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol-
lution Damage, 1969, reprinted in 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 613, 615 (1984). Also the
amount of compensation will be increased to $270.5 million at any time when three
member states are involved, and these three member states' combined annual oil
receipts exceed 600 million tons. See id. at 616. "United States ratification would
supply approximately 450 million tons of this required yearly tonnage and would
virtually ensure this increased coverage." Van Hanswyck, supra note 5, at 325 n.
45.
46. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 5, at 324. The United States was an active
participant in the Protocols, and was extremely influential in the hearings that
affected the Protocol's provisions. See id. One of the apparent influences that the
United States had on the proceedings was that states that were not a party to
either the CLC Convention or the Fund Convention would still be entitled to par-
ticipate in the Protocols. See id. at 324 n.33; see also Jones, supra note 2, at 10333
(discussing why the United States should have ratified the 1969 CLC Convention
and 1971 Fund Convention, as well as the 1984 Protocols to the CLC and Fund
Convention). See generally Mitchell, supra note 6, at 237 (discussing why the
United States was proper in not ratifying the 1984 CLC and Fund Protocols).
47. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
48. Countries that ratified the 1969 International Convention On Civil Liabil-
ity for Oil Pollution Damage are as follows: Algeria, Australia, Bahamas, Belgium,
Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Fin-
land, France, Gabon GDR, GFR, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Mon-
aco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama,
Papua, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swe-
den, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, USSR, UK, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. See Van
Hanswyk, supra note 5, at 343 (citing Multilateral Treaties: Index and Current
Status: United States Department, Office on Treaties).
Countries that ratified the 1971 International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage are as
follows: Algeria, Bahamas, Benin, Cameroon, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ga-
bon, GFR, Ghana, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Papua, Poland, Portugal,
Sri Lanka, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Tuvalu, UAE, UK, and Yugoslavia. See
id.
Many of the countries that ratified the previous international conventions for
oil pollution damage were present at the 1984 Protocols. See id at 341-42.
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The United States required specific changes, such as an in-
crease in liability standards, an increase in the standards for limi-
tation of liability and a broader geographic scope. 49 Because the
international community failed to make these changes, the United
States did not ratify the 1984 Protocols.
The concern of the United States was the direct result of a dev-
astating oil spill. Prior to the United States agreeing to ratify the
1984 Protocols, one of the most extensive and devastating oil spills
had ravaged Prince William Sound, Alaska. The catastrophic spill
from the EXXON VALDEZ led the United States to reevaluate its
oil-pollution legislation as well as evaluate whether the changes
made by the 1984 Protocols would adequately remedy a spill of
such magnitude.50 The United States decided that the changes
made by the 1984 Protocols would not adequately deal with a cata-
strophic oil spill, and, therefore, did not ratify them.
Faced with some of the most extravagant clean up costs in oil-
pollution history, and faced with a patchwork statutory system,
the United States was all but forced to enact appropriate legisla-
tion to cure the inadequacies of both the domestic and interna-
tional regimes. 61 In response, the United States enacted the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).52 OPA substantially alters the pollu-
49. See generally, Gold, supra note 18, at 423 (criticizing the haste in which
the United States Congress disregarded an international approach in favor of a
unilateral approach).
50. The clean up costs associated with the EXXON VALDEZ are in excess of
$2.5 billion dollars. Payson R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal
to Resolve the Trustee "Owner Liability Quandary, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 405, 421
n.62 (1996).
51. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of
1990: Legislation in the Wake of Crisis, 10 Nat. Resources & Env't 35 (1995); see
also Gold, supra note 18, at 424-25 (discussing the United States's reaction to the
Exxon Valdez disaster); Mitchell, supra note 6 (looking at the United States's per-
ceived inadequacies relating to the international scheme).
52. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (Aug. 18,
1990) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761; 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 9509, along with
other conforming amendments to other statutes). Legislative history of the Oil
Pollution Act states that,
[tihere is a fragmented collection of Federal and States laws providing
inadequate cleanup and damage remedies, taxpayer subsidies to cover
cleanup costs, third party damages that go uncompensated, and substan-
tial barriers to victim recoveries such as legal defenses, statutes of limita-
tions, the corporate form, and the burdens of proof that favor those
responsible for the spill.
S. EXEC. Rep. No. 28, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
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tion liabilities imposed on the "responsible party,"53 who is en-
gaged in exploration, production and transportation of oil within
the territorial seas and the "exclusive economic zone"54 of the
United States.
Today, the statutes enacted from 1851 to 1990 make up the
United States's oil-pollution statutory regime. OPA does not pre-
empt any of the aforementioned regional statutes or any individual
state law; rather, it is a supplement to each of them individually.
OPA imposes strict liability on the "responsible party" unless such
party can prove that the oil spill can be attributed to one of a lim-
ited number of defenses. 55 Thus, the United States's approach to
oil-pollution legislation has been incorporated into one statute, the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. With the advent of the Oil Pollution Act,
together with the several geographically specific statutes, the
United States has effectively, but not efficiently, legislated oil
pollution.
B. History of Canadian Oil-Pollution Legislation
Canada's history of oil-pollution legislation has not been as ex-
tensive as that of the United States. The statutory provisions deal-
ing with oil-pollution discharge from vessels were limited to a few
provisions of the Canada Shipping Act.56
In 1954, Canada implemented oil-pollution legislation using
several provisions of the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL).5 7 In implementing these
53. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) (defining a Responsible Party as "any person own-
ing, operating, or demise chartering the vessel").
54. Id. § 2701(8) ("'[E]xclusive economic zone' means the zone established by
Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983, including the
ocean waters of the areas referred to as 'eastern special areas' in Article 3(1) of the
Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Maritime Boundary.... ").
55. See id. § 2703 (illustrating the limited number of defenses afforded the
responsible party under OPA. The complete defenses under OPA are an act of
God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party (other than an employee
or agent of the responsible party)).
56. See Popp, supra note 9, at 110 (citing Part IX, ch. S-9, Revised Statutes of
Canada (R.S.C.), 1970). "[E]xcept for some provisions in the Canada Shipping Act
implementing the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil (OILPOL), aimed at controlling operational discharges of oil from ships, there
was no statutory law dealing with the legal consequences of discharges." Id. at 110.
57. See 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S., No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (1954);
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provisions, Canada hoped to control oil discharges from vessels. 58
The Canada Shipping Act did not adopt all of the liability provi-
sions of the 1954 Convention 59 because only a few provisions had
"real teeth."60 Existing statutory provisions were ambiguous as to
an individual's right to recover damages,6 ' and, therefore, people
who were harmed by oil pollution caused by ships relied on the
basic recoveries from tort law.6 2
In 1967, the Torrey Canyon disaster6 3 stirred up legislative ac-
tion in Canada. At that time, the Canadian Government realized
that existing legislation was inadequate to handle a spill of such
see also Edgar Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Per-
spective, 3 J. Mar. L. & Com. 13, 18-19 (1971) (discussing that, in 1954, the inter-
national community converged on London, for what was to be the first
internationally recognized approach to tackle oil pollution. The result of the con-
ference was the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil).
58. See Gold, supra note 57, at 18-19.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See Popp, supra note 9, at 110. For common law recovery of damages for
oil pollution from ships, see David W. Abecassis & R.L. Jarashow, Oil Pollution for
Ships 355-400 (London, Stevens & Sons: 1985); David W. Abecassis, The Law and
Practice Relating to Oil Pollution From Ships 109 (1978).
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Approximately 80,000 tons of oil
were spilled into the ocean as a result of the Torrey Canyon spill. See Gold, supra
note 57, at 22 (citing Ved P. Nanda, The 'Torrey Canyon' Disaster: Some Legal
Aspects, 44 Deny. L.J. 400, 404 (1967)). However, alternate estimates had the to-
tal number of gallons spilled in excess of 115,000 gallons. See Kopec & Peterson,
supra note 10, at 598 (citing Van Hanswyk, supra note 5, at 319). The spill caused
damage as far as two hundred and twenty five miles away. The majority of oil was
released after the ship had grounded, and up until the point where the ship was
ordered to be bombed. See Gold, supra, at 22 (citing Nanda, supra). The British
Government ordered the ship to be bombed because it was decided that there was
no other feasible way to deal with the wreck. See id. "Over 2.5 million gallons of
various chemical dispersants were used, often with more disastrous results on the
marine environment than the crude oil itself." Id. (citing Dr. Molly Spooner of the
Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom before the 'Arrow' Royal
Commission, Pollution of Canadian Waters by Oil, Transcript Vol. 14, at 2094).
See generally Linda Rosenthal & Carol Raper, Note, Amoco Cadiz and Limitation
of Liability for Oil Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 Va. J.
Nat. Resources L. 259 (1985) (discussing the broad reaching legal issues raised by
the Torrey Canyon oil spill); see also Nanda, supra note 63, at 400 (same). The
1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
(OILPOL) addressed the deliberate discharge of oil by ocean vessels, but did not
address the oil pollution caused by accident. See 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900,
327 U.N.T.S. 3 (1954).
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great magnitude and its devastating after affects. 64 Because Can-
ada has such an extensive coastline,65 potential oil-pollution de-
struction could be extremely far reaching and devastating. The
Canadian government decided that it needed a more effective form
of oil-pollution legislation to cope with a catastrophe comparable to
Torrey Canyon.66
In December of 1968, Canada implemented legislation that
amended the Canada Shipping Act and gave the government pow-
ers over ships causing pollution.67 This legislation imposed strict
liability on the owners of the vessels.68 When this legislation, Bill
S-23, finally became an amendment to the Canada Shipping Act,
the government had basically no cost-recovery powers.6 9 Outside
influences negated these cost-recovery powers during the legisla-
tion's infant stages.70 Bill S-23 received the most opposition and
pressure in reference to clause 24, which gave the Minister of
Transport certain powers. 71 Resistance came from outside
sources, who provided evidence to the Senate Committee that the
64. See Gold, supra note 57, at 21-23 (stating that for many conservationists
and any others concerned with pollution the Torrey Canyon oil spill was undoubt-
edly a "blessing in disguise").
65. Both Canada and the United States have extensive coastlines that could
potentially be the victim of a very serious oil spill. Canada has one of the world's
most extensive coastlines, with 36,356 miles. These figures include provincial
Canada, as well as the Yukon and the Northern Territories. The World Almanac
749 (1998). The United States does not have nearly as much coastline as Canada,
with 12,383 miles. See id. at 541. With such extensive coastlines, both countries
are subject to all that comes with the sea, including oil spills.
66. See Gold, supra note 57, at 25. "There is no question that for those con-
cerned with pollution the Torrey Canyon disaster was a 'blessing in disguise.'" Id.
at 22.
67. See Bill S-23 to amend the Canada Shipping Act, 115 Sen. Deb. 781 (Can.
1968-1969). Bill S-23 gave the Minister of Transport power to order the removal or
destruction of a wrecked polluting vessel, to use the proceeds from the sale of such
a vessel or cargo towards removal expenses, and to allocate total liability of all
cleanup expenses to the vessel's owners, charterers or operators. Gold, supra note
57, at 26 (citing Bill S-23 to amend the Canada Shipping Act, 115 Sen. Deb. 781
(Can. 1968-1969)).
68. See Gold, supra note 57, at 26.
69. See id. (citing An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act, 17-18 Eliz. 2, ch.
53, ss.23-24 (July 9, 1969)).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 26. Clause 24 of Bill S-23 consisted of the following powers given
to the Minister of Transport:
"(1) Order the removal or destruction of a wrecked polluting vessel;
(2) Use the proceeds from the sale of such a vessel or cargo towards removal
expenses;
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"total liability" provision of subsection (3) of clause 24 should be
deleted.7 2 The clause would impose all clean-up costs to the ves-
sel's owners, charterers, or operators. This clause was not looked
upon favorably by the members of the shipping industry because of
the negative impact it would have had on the shipping industry.
Inevitably, the overwhelming influence from the shipping industry
succeeded and subsection (3) of clause 24 was deleted from the fi-
nal version of the amendment to the Canada Shipping Act.73
Canada's attempt to improve oil-pollution legislation fell short
of what was actually expected. The Canadian Government viewed
Bill S-23 as a temporary revision, subject to inevitable amendment
in the near future. Thus, the Canadian government knew that its
'interim' legislation could not adequately handle an oil spill of
great magnitude.74
In 1969, the international community was assembling in Brus-
sels for a conference to devise an international scheme for oil-pollu-
tion legislation.75 This conference addressed two proposed
conventions on the subject of maritime oil pollution: the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC), 76 and the International Convention Relating to Interven-
tion on the High Seas in the Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (In-
(3) Allocate total liability of all clean-up expenses to the vessel's owners, charter-
ers or operators."
Id. (citing Bill S-23 to amend the Canada Shipping Act, 115 Sen. Deb. 781 (Can.
1968-1969)).
72. Gold, supra note 57, at 26 (citing Bill S-23 to amend the Canada Shipping
Act, 115 Sen. Deb. 781 (Can. 1968-1969)).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 25.
75. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
76. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970). The Conference focused
on parties liable under the Convention, the basis of liability, jurisdiction, the limi-
tation of actions, judgements, limitation of liability, and financial responsibility.
See Nicholas J. Healy, The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol-
lution Damage, 1969, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 317, 318-19 (1970).
In 1971, two years proceeding the adoption of CLC, the International Conven-
tion on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Dam-
age (the Fund) was formed. See International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972).
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tervention Convention).77 The CLC was drafted to "'adopt uniform
international rules and procedures for determining questions of li-
ability and providing adequate compensation'" for oil pollution
from ships.78 The most difficult resolution facing the conference
at Brussels was determining who should be the "liable party."79
The conference decided to channel all liability to the registered
owner of the vessel, eliminating the need for any party, other than
the shipowner, to insure against claims for damage caused by oil
pollution.80
Canada disagreed with this approach. Canada refused to en-
dorse any law that did not protect the victim and the marine envi-
ronment, including the rights of coast nations most endangered by
the transport of oil in bulk.8 ' "The Canadian position was simply
that the responsibility for the costs of spills and damages to third
parties should rest with the collective industry, whether ship-
owner, charterer, operator, cargo-owner, and that innocent parties
should not be damaged even by a mistake."8 2 The international
community, however, agreed that the Canadian ideas diverged
drastically from the much accepted "old concepts of absolutely un-
qualified freedom of the seas."8 3 The result of the conference, as
seen from the Canadian viewpoint, was much more of a slow mov-
77. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068,
970 U.N.T.S. 211.
78. CLC, supra note 45, preamble. See generally Healy, supra note 76, at 321
(discussing limitations of liability). "The Canadian position was simply that the
responsibility for the costs of the spills and damages to third parties should rest
with the collective industry, whether ship-owner, charterer, operator or cargo-
owner, and that innocent parties should not be damaged even by a mistake." Gold,
supra note 57, at 27.
79. The conference at Brussels decided to classify the registered owner as the
liable party. This simple solution of labeling the registered owner as the liable
party was an easy way of channeling liability, but was less than adequate at ad-
dressing the inherent problems that would arise in the contractual and manage-
ment arrangements involved in ocean going oil transport. See Popp, supra note 9,
at 118-19 (discussing the channeling of liability by the conference); see also Healy,
supra note 76, at 319 (same).
80. See Popp, supra note 9, at 120. This classification was also believed to
favor the adoption of higher limitations on liability for the registered owner.
81. See Gold, supra note 57, at 27.
82. Id.
83.. Id. at 27. Canada viewed the unqualified freedom of the seas approach as
more or less a "license to pollute." This approach continued to protect the rights of
the shipping industry, but failed to address the interests of the coastal states. See
id.
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ing process and reluctance by the shipping nations to adopt laws
benefiting the marine environment. Canada did agree that,
although a disappointing result, the result of the Brussels Confer-
ence was a step in the right direction.8 4
However, the conference's slow moving tactics, over-conserva-
tism and deep-rooted involvement in old concepts deterred several
nations, not just Canada, from ratifying the international
scheme.8 5 "In establishing a statutory regime the question was
whether Canada should follow and ratify the Civil Liability Con-
vention or develop its own 'made in Canada' regime." 6 Neither
Canada nor the United States ratified the 1969 CLC Convention
nor the 1971 Fund Convention. Dissatisfied with the Brussels
Conference, the Canadian Government proceeded to formulate its
own oil-pollution legislation.8 7
The Canadian government decided to forge ahead with its own
legislation. This legislation, which amended the Canada Shipping
Act, resembled the newly invoked international scheme, but had
some obvious differences.88 For example, the liability provisions in
the 'new' Part XX of the Canada Shipping Act closely resembled
the related provisions in the CLC pertaining to basis of liability
and limits on liability.89 At the time, observers viewed Canadian
legislation as ahead of its time, but it did not take long for Parlia-
ment to recognize the remaining inadequacies of its oil-pollution
84. See id. at 29.
85. See id. at 28.
86. Popp, supra note 9, at 110-11.
87. Shortly proceeding the conference at Brussels the Prime Minister of Can-
ada made a statement concerning Canada's reaction:
[T]he way international law exists now, it is definitely biased in favour of
shipping in the high seas and in the various parts of the globe. And in the
past this has probably been to the benefit of the states of the world be-
cause there has been, because of the bias of international law, a great deal
of the development of commerce in all parts of the globe .... ITlhis was
fine in the past, but now with the advance of technology and the impor-
tance which is coming forth to us all in all parts of the world-of not only
thinking of commerce, but also of quality of life.
Gold, supra note 57, at 28 (citing 9 Int'l Leg. Matls. 600, 602-03 (1970)),
88. See Popp, supra note 9, at 111 (citing R.S.C., 1970, 2nd Supp., ch. 27).
89. See R.S.C., 1970, 2d Supp., ch. 27, § 735(2); CLC, supra note 45, at Art. III
(2). The Canadian government tried to keep in line with the legislative acts of the
CLC by establishing its own fund to compensate for oil pollution from vessels
called the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund (MPCF). See R.S.C., 1970, 2d. Supp.,
ch. 27, § 748(1).
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legislation.90 In the following years, Canada, as well as the inter-
national community, realized not only that a large scale oil spill
was inevitable, but that the existing international and domestic
schemes could not handle a catastrophic spill.91
In 1984, the members of the CLC and a number of other na-
tions gathered to address the inefficiencies of the existing CLC. 92
At the conference, the members enacted protocols for the CLC
(Protocol CLC) and IOPC Fund (Protocol Fund).93 Parties present
at the Protocol agreed that there was a need to amend the existing
convention. The parties were "[clonvinced that the economic conse-
quences of pollution damage resulting from the carriage of oil in
bulk at sea by ships should continue to be shared by the shipping
industry and by the oil cargo interests .... -94 Although a partici-
pant in the formation of the Protocol, Canada did not ratify it.95
Although the 1984 Protocols seemed to be the international com-
munity's best method for dealing with marine oil pollution, Can-
ada, with its extensive coastline, still feared a catastrophic spill
and the Protocols' inability to compensate for it.96 However, Can-
ada did implement a number of the existing CLC and the Fund
90. For an analysis of some of the apparent inadequacies, see Popp, supra
note 9, at 112-113.
91. See generally Van Hanswyk, supra note 5, at 319 (illustrating the ways in
which the international community had developed to handle an oil spill of cata-
strophic proportions).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46; Protocol of 1984 to Amend the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, re-
printed in 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 613, 613-22 (1984); Protocol of 1984 to Amend the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, reprinted in 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 623,
623-33 (1984).
93. See Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, supra note 92, at 613-22; Protocol of 1984 to
Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 92, at 623-33.
94. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971,
supra note 92, at 623 (emphasis added).
95. See Gold, supra note 18.
[Ilt appeared at that time that the oil and shipping industries had
achieved an ideal compromise with coastal states, which would provide
the marine and coastal environment with the best and most realistic com-
pensation and liability schemes available and would also fully compensate
for all but the most catastrophic damage.
Id. at 432-33.
96. See id.
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provisions. 97 In 1987, Canada evaluated its own position on oil-
pollution legislation, introducing several amendments to the Can-
ada Shipping Act.
These new amendments became effective in 1989, and are ba-
sically a rewrite of the liability provisions of the Canada Shipping
Act (CSA).98 These provisions implement many of the same liabil-
ity provisions that exist in the CLC, even though Canada did not
ratify either the CLC Protocols or the Fund Protocols of 1984. The
adoption of an international scheme has, however, afforded Can-
ada access to the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
(IOPC Fund).
The new Canadian regime, unlike prior legislation, is now ex-
clusively concerned with oil pollution. The CSA adopted the inter-
national approach to oil pollution prevention and compensation,
but has not entirely adopted the international conventions. 99 The
liability provisions apply to all ships that cause oil pollution, but
some provisions provide special rules when the spill is caused by a
"convention ship."100 Convention ships are the ships, whether reg-
istered or unregistered, that are owned by a Contracting State or
97. The CLC Protocol of 1984 continued to have strict liability and the de-
fenses to strict liability also remained in tact. The geographical scope of the CLC
was to be expanded to include the exclusive economic zone of any contracting state.
The Protocol also enlarged the classes of parties that would not be found liable,
and also raised the maximum level of compensation available for oil pollution dam-
age. The Protocol also increased the liability limits of both the CLC and the Fund.
See Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, supra note 92, at 613-22; Protocol of 1984 to Amend
the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 92, at 623-33.
98. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, §§ 673-728 (1985) (Can.).
These amendments were invoked on the same date as the Civil Liability Conven-
tion and the Fund Convention were in Canada.
99. See id.
100. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, §§ 680-695 (1985) (Can.).
Section 673 states in part: "'Convention ship' means a sea-going ship, wherever
registered, carrying, in bulk as cargo, crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubrica-
ting oil, whale oil or any other persistent oil." Id. The CLC has defined ship as
follows: "'Ship' means any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type
whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo." International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art. I(1), reprinted in 1 J. Mar. L. & Com.
373, 374 (1970). The CLC Protocol has defined ship as follows:
"Ship" means any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatso-
ever constructed or adopted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, pro-
vided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be
regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo
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any "Person"101 who is an "owner"'0 2 of a ship. It appears by the
language of both the CSA and CLC that if a ship is from a Con-
tracting State, whether by registration or by ownership, it will be
treated as a "convention ship" for purposes of liability.
Canada has implemented a statutory regime that incorporates
a "quasi-international approach" without fully utilizing the inter-
national scheme. Due to its lenient approach to the shipping in-
dustry, however, Canada's efforts to create oil-pollution legislation
adequate to deal with a large-scale oil spill have noticeably fallen
short.
II. COMPARISON OF THE LIABILITY REGIMES
A. Liability
1. Liability Under OPA
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), like the international
scheme, includes broad liability provisions, and establishes a fund
to respond in the event of a large scale oil spill.103 OPA has estab-
lished a liability regime that invokes strict, joint and several liabil-
ity,'0 4 against the responsible party,10 5 encompassing all parties
responsible in any way for the discharge, or threatened discharge,
and during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it
has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.
Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969, Art. HI(1), supra note 92, at 613-22.
101. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art.
1(2), supra note 100, at 374. The CLC defines person as follows: "'Person' means
any individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether corporate or
not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions." Id.
102. Id. at 374. The CLC defines owner as follows: "'Owner' means the person
or persons registered as the owner of the ship, or in the absence of the registration,
the person or persons owning the ship. However, in the case of the ship owned by a
State and operated by a company which in that State is registered as the ship's
operator, 'owner' shall mean such company." Id. Under the CLC, the term "regis-
tration" does not seem to have a real significance if the ship is from a Contracting
State. The "'State of the ship's registry' means in relation to registered ships or
the State of registration of the ship, and in relation to unregistered ships the State
whose flag the ship is flying." Id.
103. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994) (discussing the elements of liability such as
removal costs; damages (natural, real and personal property, subsistence use, rev-
enues, profits and earning capacity, public services); excluded discharges; and lia-
bility of third parties); supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also § 2712
(discussing the uses of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund).
104. See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(17) (1994) (applying the standard
of liability which is obtained in 33 U.S.C. § 1321).
19981
356 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:335
of oilO° 6 from tank vessels 0 7 into the navigable waters of the
United States.108 Thus, OPA provides that each responsible party
is strictly liable under the Act for the discharge of oil or for the
substantial threat of the discharge of oil, and is liable for removal
costs and damages. 10 9
The use of the term "responsible party" by the provisions of
OPA provides potential recovery benefits from a seemingly endless
array of defendants. 110 The array of defendants could include own-
ers and operators of vessels, owners and operators of facilities in
navigable waters, owners and operators of pipelines and even the
licensees of deepwater ports."' The legislators implemented a no
fault liability regime because oil transport is potentially of such a
risk to the environment and because legislators believed that the
parties involved in such a lucrative business must assume the re-
sponsibility for a catastrophic spill.112 The use of such a broad def-
inition for the liable party reflects the underlying theme of OPA
and its goal of making the actual oil polluter pay for his acts. This
105. See id. § 2701(32)(A) ("'[Riesponsible party' means .... In the case of a
vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel.").
106. See id. § 2701(23) ("'[Olil' means oil of any kind or in any form.").
107. See id. § 2701(34) ("'[Tlank vessel' means a vessel that is constructed or
adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo or
cargo residue, and that-
(A) is a vessel of the United States;
(B) operates on the navigable waters; or
(C) transfers oil or hazardous material in a place subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.").
For the purposes of this comment, the term vessel is to be defined strictly as ves-
sels constructed or adapted for the transport of oil, and do not include the descrip-
tion of any watercraft or other type of machinery used, as defined in 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(37).
108. See id. § 2701(21) ("'[Navigable waters' means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial sea.").
109. See id. § 2702(a). The removal costs and damages covered by OPA include
all removal costs, damages to natural resources, real or personal property, dam-
ages for the loss of subsistence use of natural resources, revenues, loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity, and the net costs for providing public services. Id.
§ 2702(b)(2)(A)-(F).
110. See Wagner, supra note 2, at 574. For a look at some of the criticisms of
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, see Gold, supra note 18, at 423. "[Tlhe OPA 1990
specifically does not preempt state laws, which may impose additional or other,
heavier liabilities on shipowners, unlimited liability appears to be the name of the
new U.S. game!" Id. at 436 (emphasis added); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (preserving
state law claims against the responsible party).
111. See id.
112. See S. Rep. No. 101-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 722.
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also reflects the theme of oil-pollution prevention, creating an in-
centive to transport bulk oil safely.113
Under the Act, the treatment of third parties has been ad-
dressed in two provisions-one for third party liability and another
for use as a defense. A third party will be treated as a "responsible
party" when the initial "responsible party" can show that the dis-
charge was caused solely by the act or omission of the third
party.1 4 If the responsible party can prove these circumstances,
the third party will, in effect, become the responsible party, thus
subject to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the responsible
party's liability for the spill transfers to the third party if the spill
was caused solely by the act or omission of the third party.1 5
However, if the responsible party could not show the third party
was solely responsible for the discharge," 6 a third party could po-
tentially escape liability.
Under OPA, a claimant can pursue claims against all respon-
sible parties, an idea which is in stark contrast to the provisions
adopted by the Canada Shipping Act. 1 7 This expansive approach
113. The legislative history of OPA stressed the need for oil pollution preven-
tion. Senate Report No. 101-94 stated:
The oil spills over the past five months clearly show that we are not us-
ing-or have not yet developed-technology capable of containing spills of
less than a million gallons, let alone the spills the size of the Exxon
Valdez. The spills of less than one million gallons also demonstrated that
any oil spill, no matter how quickly we respond to it or how well we con-
tain it, is going to harm the environment. Consequently, preventing oil
spills is more important than containing them and cleaning them up
quickly.
Moreover, four major oil spills within a three-month period suggest
that spills are still too much of an accepted cost of doing business for the
oil shipping industry. At the present time, the costs of spilling and paying
for its clean-up and damage is not high enough to encourage greater in-
dustry efforts to prevent spills and develop effective techniques to contain
them.
Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(d)(1)(A) (1994) (allowing a responsible party to prove
that a spill was caused solely by the act or omission of one or more third parties,
thus, re-designating a third party as the responsible party).
115. See id. § 2703 (a)(3) (allowing the responsible party a complete defense to
all claims, if it can be proven that a third party was solely the cause of the oil
damage).
116. See id.
117. Under the Canada Shipping Act, the owner of the ship is the liable party.
Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(4) (1985) (Can.). Therefore, it
appears that all claimants must bring their respective claims against the owner of
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to liability stresses the need for all parties involved in the trans-
port of oil to follow appropriate regulations and guidelines because
the long arm of OPA will cover even those remotely responsible for
oil-pollution damage.
2. Liability Under the Canada Shipping Act
Canada, like the United States, has implemented oil-pollution
legislation with a strict liability regime. Canada has also devel-
oped a fund to compensate for costs and damages. 118 Unlike the
United States, however, Canada narrowed its liability regime by
incorporating the definition of "owner" as the liable party.119
Under the CSA, the liable party will be either the registered
owner, when dealing with a convention ship, or when referring to
all other ships, the person having the rights of owner.120 The CSA
governs the discharge of oil, establishing separate provisions to en-
compass "ships" and "convention ships."121 When discharged from
the ship. See id. Section 677(5) states that no provision of the CSA prohibits the
owner of a ship from bringing any claim against any other person. See id. The
strict liability of the owner requires the claimants to bring actions against the
owner, and in turn the owner will have to bring claims against any other party.
118. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(1-3) (1985) (Can.)
(discussing the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund); see also id. § 720 (requiring those
contributing to the Oil Pollution Fund to records of contibutions made).
119. Id. § 673 (stating that an "'owner' of a ship means (a) in relation to a Con-
vention ship, the person registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of
registration, the person owning the ship, or (b) in relation to any other ship, the
person having for the time being, either by law or by contract, the rights of the
owner of the ship as regards the possession and use thereof").
120. See id. § 677(1). This simple classification leaves no room for argument as
to who the liable party is. There can only be one registered owner. This seems to
follow the persistent theme of the international society to channel liability in the
most 'simple' of classifications. See supra note 78.
121. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 675. Section 675 states:
(1) For ships other than Convention ships, this Part applies in respect of
actual or anticipated oil pollution damage
(a) in any place in Canada,
(b) in Canadian waters, and
(c) in any fishing zone of Canada prescribed pursuant to the Territorial
Sea and Fishing Zones Act,
except where the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act applies, irrespec-
tive of the location of the actual or expected discharge of the pollutant and
irrespective of the location where any preventive measures are taken.
(2) For Convention ships, this Part applies, subject to subsection (3), in
respect of actual or anticipated oil pollution damage
(a) in any place in Canada,
(b) in Canadian waters, and
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a "non-convention ship," oil is defined as "oil of any kind or of any
form." 122 The term "oil" only refers to persistent oil when the dis-
charge has taken place from a convention ship.123 Most oil pollu-
tion is caused by "persistent" oil, because that it is the
classification of oil used in most modern ship engines and the type
that is most abundantly transported by vessels.
Under the CSA, there are variant schemes for liability, de-
pending on the type or classification of the "ship."124 For instance,
if a convention ship discharges oil, under section 681 of the Canada
Shipping Act, the owner is not liable for the damages if sustained
by Canada or any member of the Civil Liability Convention. 125
However, the ordinary ship owner is held strictly liable for the dis-
charge of oil, notwithstanding certain defenses and third party
issues.
The CSA, like OPA, allows the vessel's owner to alleviate the
amount of liability if attributable to the act or omission of a third
party.126 The owner's liability will be "reduced or nullified" in pro-
portion to the degree of fault attributable to the third party.127
These differences in liability between the CSA's fault and privity
standard and OPA's strict liability can create confusion in the
(c) on the territory or in the territorial sea of a state other than Canada
that is a party to the Civil Liability Convention,irrespective of the location
of the actual or expected discharge of the oil and irrespective of the loca-
tion where any preventive measures are taken.
Id. § 675.
122. Id. § 673 (stating that "'[o]il,' except in sections 716 to 721, means oil of
any kind or in any form and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, in-
cludes petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and oil mixed with wastes but does not
include dredged spoil").
123. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Oil can be divided into two
categories-"persistent" and "non-persistent." "Non-persistent" oils are highly
volatile, evaporate quickly, and leave relatively no residue (e.g. gasoline). "Persis-
tent" oils include crude oils transported in bulk for refining (e.g. diesel and lubrica-
ting oils or heavy oils). Unlike "non-persistent" oils, if "persistent" oils are spilled,
in a very short time they will cover a great distance and cause severe damage. See
Gold, supra note 57, at 16.
124. See supra note 121.
125. See id. § 681 (referring to the damages caused in situations illustrated in
§ 677); see also supra note 62 (discussing common law recovery of damages for oil
pollution from ships).
126. See id. § 677(4)(a), (b) (allowing the owner of a ship to prove that the dam-
age resulted wholly or partially by the act or omission of the person who suffered
the damage with intent to cause the damage, or that the person acted negligently,
thus, reducing or nullifying his liability accordingly).
127. See id. § 677(4)(b).
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event of a trans-territorial spill. Furthermore, these provisions
create the potential for inconsistent judgments, therefore lending
to the added inefficiency of both systems.
3. Comparison of the OPA and CSA Liability Regimes
The difference between the designation of the liable party as
"owner" in Canada and "responsible party" in the United States
could obviously create extensive confusion when assigning liability
for a trans-territorial oil spill.128 OPA reaches past the narrow
threshold of the registered owner and holds liable each and every
party responsible for the discharge of the oil. The CSA, on the
other hand, adopts strict liability, holding only the registered
owner liable in the case of convention ships, 129 and in the case of
all other ships, holding liable that "person having for the time be-
ing, either by law or by contract, the right of the owner of the ship
as regards the possession and use thereof."130 This provision of the
CSA narrows the potential liable parties when a convention ship is
involved, but applies a broader label, like OPA, when referring to
all other ships. However, the CSA designation of the liable party
still does not have the broad sweeping grasp as does OPA's "re-
sponsible party" designation. This distinction is an attempt by the
Canadian government to implement an international approach to-
ward oil-pollution legislation,' 3 ' but has resulted in an inadequate
provision that may inequitably hold the ship owner liable. 132 Be-
128. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A), and § 2702(a) (defining "responsible
party" and his liability), with Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 673
(1985) (Can.) (defining "owner" and his liability), and § 677. The comparison of the
two provisions will illustrate that there is a greater number of possible parties who
could be held liable under the Oil Pollution Act.
129. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 673 (1985) (Can.).
130. Id.; see also Popp, supra note 9, at 117 (discussing the different definitions
of liability in the competing regimes). There is the possibility that if a trans-terri-
torial spill occurs, the operator or charterer could be liable in the United States,
but not in Canada.
131. The definition of the liable party as the "owner" is much narrower than the
definition of "responsible party," thus, remaining consistent with the definition of
owner used in the CLC. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Art. 1(3), reprinted in 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 373, 374 (1970).
132. The subject of ownership will be a paramount issue for debate in OPA
litigation. Because the CSA and the CLC have decided "simply" to characterize
the liable party as the registered owner, there will not be the extensive debates
that could become apparent under OPA. The Canadian and the International re-
gimes, attempting to make a "simple" designation of the liable party, have far too
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cause the potential for unlimited liability exists under OPA, there
may be a real debate as to who is the responsible party. There is
more of an incentive for a party to litigate the issue of "responsible
party," because of OPA's broad reach. Whereas, under the CSA,
there is no such debate because the liable party is the "owner."
Furthermore, the different definitions of "oil" between OPA
and CSA make it difficult to determine how each country would
react in the event of a trans-territorial spill. 133 OPA applies to oil
in any form, but the CSA applies differently in the cases of conven-
tion ships and all other ships.134 It appears that the intent of the
Canadian scheme is to benefit those members of the Civil Liability
Convention. 135 The Canadian move toward a uniform oil pollution
narrowly channeled the liability, thus, excluding many necessary parties. See
Popp, supra note 9, at 113-14.
133. Compare Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 673 (1985) (Can.)
(defining "convention ship"), with 33 U.S.C. § 2702(23) (defining "ship").
134. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 673 (1985) (Can.). Section
681 of the Canada Shipping Act states in relevant part:
(1) The owner of a Convention ship is not liable for the matters referred to
in subsection 677(1) otherwise than as provided by this Part.
(2) No servant or agent of the owner of a Convention ship nor any person
performing salvage operations with the agreement of the owner shall be
liable for the matters referred to in subsection 677(1).
Id. § 681.
Section 677(1). Civil Liability for Pollution of the Canada Shipping Act illus-
trates the liability of the owner of the ship for pollution, and states in relevant
part:
(1) Subject to this Part, the owner of a ship is liable
(a) for oil pollution damage from the ship;
(b) for costs and expenses incurred by
(i) a public authority in Canada, or
(ii) a public authority in a state other than Canada that is a party to the
Civil Liability Convention, in respect of measures taken to prevent, re-
pair, remedy or minimize oil pollution damage from the ship, including
measures taken in anticipation of a discharge of oil from the ship, to the
extent that the measures taken and the costs and expenses are reason-
able, and for any loss or damage caused by such measures; and
(c) for costs and expenses incurred by the Minister in respect of measures
taken pursuant to subsection 678
(1) to the extent that the measures taken and the costs and expenses are
reasonable, and for any loss or damage caused by such measures.
Id. § 677(1).
135. Diplomatic representatives of some 49 countries gathered at Brussels
November 10-28, 1969 to attend the International Legal Conference con-
vened by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO). The purpose of the Conference was to consider two draft conven-
tions on the subject of maritime oil pollution-the International Conven-
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legislation has been lost in the country's struggle between ade-
quate domestic legislation and the most effective international leg-
islation. Additionally, Canada's attempt to provide the most
adequate oil pollution laws has failed to make that goal coincide
with the interests of Canada's closest neighbor, the United States.
Although both OPA and the CSA subscribe to what is referred
to as strict liability, the differences in the regimes' liability struc-
tures make it hard to assess what would happen in the event of a
potential trans-territorial spill. The all encompassing goal of hav-
ing adequate oil-pollution legislation has led these neighboring na-
tions down diverging paths, diminishing the underlying hope for
uniformity in the near future. 136
B. Defenses to Liability
1. Defenses to Liability Under OPA
OPA provides complete defenses to the responsible party if the
discharge or the substantial threat of discharge of oil was "caused
solely by-(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission
of a third party ... "137 The word "solely" has been incorporated to
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pol-
lution Casualties.
Healy, supra note 76, at 317 (citations omitted). The Civil Liability Convention is
an international approach to the oil pollution problems across the globe. In the
provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, convention ships have separate treatment
than all other ships. The treatment of these convention ships is dealt with accord-
ing to the provisions set forth in the Canada Shipping Act. See Canada Shipping
Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, §§ 675(2), (3), § 676, § 677, § 679(2), § 680 to § 686
(1985) (Can.). Sections 680 to 686 are titled Special Rules for Ships Covered by
Civil Liability Convention and illustrate the different treatment afforded to con-
vention ships. Id. §§ 680-686.
136. For a critical stance on the congressional enactment of OPA, see Mark J.
Yost, International Maritime Law & the U.S. Admiralty Lawyer: A Current Assess-
ment, 7 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 313, 335-37. "Unfortunately, the unilateralism of OPA
shouts to the world that, at least for the present, the United States has rejected
global solutions to pollution liability in the maritime global commons." Id. at 336-
37; see Francesco Berlingieri, Uniformity in Maritime Law and Implementation of
International Conventions, 18 J. Mar. L. & Com. 317 (1987); Lizabeth Burrell, Cur-
rent Problems in Maritime Uniformity, 5 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 67 (1992); F.L. Wiswall,
Jr., Uniformity in Maritime Law: The Domestic Impact of International Maritime
Regulation, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1208 (1983).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1)-(3) (1994). The responsible party must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the discharge or substantial threat of discharge
was the sole cause of one of the aforementioned defenses. See id. § 2703(a). The
act or omission of a third party must be a person other than an employee or agent
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limit the availability of the defense to the responsible party.'3 8
This standard is a significantly high hurdle for the responsible
party to clear. The responsible party must prove that the dis-
charge was caused entirely through the fault of a third party. In
the case of the third party defense, the responsible party must es-
tablish that they exercised due care and took any necessary pre-
cautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third
parties.139
OPA also allows the responsible party a complete defense
against a particular claimant, if the responsible party can show
that the incident was caused by the "gross negligence or willful
of the responsible party, or a third party whose act or omission occurred in any
connection with a contractual relationship with the responsible party. See id.
§ 2703(a)(3). Legislative history provides the congressional intent to restrict cases
in which a responsible party could defend its liability for an oil spill. As one of the
advocates for the restriction of liability defenses stated:
[u]nder my amendment, the owner or operator of the tanker will have an
obligation to co-operate in responding to the spill, no matter what the cir-
cumstances might be. Even if the spill results entirely from an act of God,
or from the action of some third party, I believe-and my amendment re-
quires-that the tanker or facility owner help to respond to the spill, and
that he obeys instructions from the appropriate Federal or State official
pursuant to the National Contingency Plan. The purpose of the amend-
ment is to make certain that, whenever there is an oil spill, there is an
incentive for those who are on the scene to do everything possible, as
quickly as possible, to respond to the spill, to limit the damage, to protect
natural resources and to obey the orders of the government officials who
are in charge.
Wu Chao, Pollution from the Carriage of Oil by Sea: Liability and Compensation
238 n.41 (1996) (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. H8241-H8255, H8259-H8288: House of
Representatives floor debate (November 9, 1989), N 1401).
138. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (referring to the complete defenses offered under
OPA).
139. See id. § 2703(a)(3)(A), (B). In the event that the responsible party shows
that they are not liable, the responsible party may still have to pay the removal
costs and damages to the claimant, if the third party refuses to do so. Section
2702(d)(1)(B) states in relevant part:
(B) Subrogation of responsible party
If the responsible party alleges that the discharge or threat of a discharge
was caused solely by an act or omission of a third party, the responsible
party-
(i) in accordance with section 2713 of this title, shall pay removal costs
and damages to any claimant; and
(ii) shall be entitled by subrogation to all rights of the United States Gov-
ernment and the claimant to recover removal costs or damages from the
third party or the Fund paid under this subsection.
Id. § 2702(d)(1)(B).
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misconduct of the claimant."140 This defense will lower liability to
the extent that the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the
third party caused the incident. At one time the responsible party
was also given the complete defense of governmental negligence,
which meant that if the government failed to perform any of its
duties, such as the maintenance of channel buoys, then the respon-
sible party would be free from liability. 141 Thus, OPA removed the
defense of governmental negligence, which had previously existed
in the FVPCA.142
To access these defenses to liability, the responsible party
must satisfy significant requirements. The responsible party will
not be entitled to any of the aforementioned complete defenses if
he fails to report the oil spill as required by law and knows or has
reason to know of the spill; fails to provide reasonable cooperation
and assistance requested by and in connection with the removal
activities; or fails to comply with an order regarding removal
activities."43
The United States began drafting these defenses during a time
of overall consensus that the transporters of oil in bulk comprise
an industry that should bear the burden itself.144 By drafting
these defenses, the United States has more firmly established a
hard-line approach to domestic oil-pollution legislation. As a re-
sult, the United States has put more pressure on those involved in
the business of oil transportation to take all preventative meas-
ures, providing defenses only in instances when the outside acts
are too remote in nature to be expected.
140. Id. § 2703(b) (referring to the responsible party's ability to negate an as-
serted claim if it can be proven that the incident was caused by the gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct of the claimant).
141. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(2).
142. See id. § 2703; cf 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(2) (stating that negligence on the
part of the United States was a viable defense).
143. See id. § 2703(c)(1), (2), (3). The orders requiring compliance referred to in
subsection (3) are the Federal Removal Authority and Civil Enforcement subsec-
tions of the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c), (e).
144. See Gold, supra note 18, at 436-37 (discussing some of the reasons why the
United States decided to enact the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
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2. Defenses Under the CSA
The Canada Shipping Act also affords certain defenses to the
owner of the vessel for oil-pollution damage, 145 including defense
provisions taken exclusively from the 1969 International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 146 Under the
CSA, the owner will not be held liable if he establishes that the
occurrence:
resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrec-
tion or from a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevita-
ble and irresistible character; was wholly caused by an act or
omission of a third party with intent to cause damage; or was
wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any
government or other authority responsible for the mainte-
nance of lights or other navigational aids, in the exercise of
that function. 147
The term "third party" is not defined in the CSA, leaving any party
involved in an oil spill open to potential liability. The CSA govern-
mental defense protects the Canadian Government and any other
government that is responsible for maintenance of navigational
assistance devices.' 48 The CSA, like OPA, also has a defense appli-
cable against a particular claimant or damaged party.149 The
owner of a ship may reduce or nullify liability in proportion to the
degree that the incident resulted "wholly or partially" from an act
or omission by the person actually suffering the damage. For the
145. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3) (1985) (Can.)
(listing the owner's available defenses).
146. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 373, 374 (1970). Article
III, paragraph 2 states:
No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves
that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a nat-
ural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character,
or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Gov-
ernment or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or
other navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
Id.
147. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3)(1)(a), (b), and (c)
(1985) (Can.).
148. See id. § 677(3)(1)(c).
149. See id. § 677(4)(a), (b).
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liability of the owner to be "reduced or nullified" in proportion to
the degree that the occurrence resulted from the acts of that per-
son, the party that suffered the damage must have the intent to
cause damage or act negligently. 150 Thus, the owner asserting the
third party defense and the actual claimant defense has a lower
standard to achieve under the CSA than that established by OPA
because the preventive measures do not have to be taken under the
CSA. Overall, the defenses available under the CSA and the CLC
are broader and more available than those under OPA.
3. Comparison of the Defenses of OPA and CSA
The CSA provides more defenses than OPA and is far less
stringent as to when these defenses are available to the liable
party. There are some very obvious differences between the two
statutes, and some less evident subtleties that would effect the
consistency of judgments in a trans-territorial incident.
First, and most evident, is the difference between the third
party defenses. 151 OPA requires that the responsible party show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the third party is solely
responsible for the incident. First, however, the responsible party
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he exercised
due care and took reasonable and foreseeable precautions against
acts or omissions by the third party.152 In contrast, the CSA al-
lows an owner to defend liability by showing that the act or omis-
sion of a third party was wholly or partially the reason for the
occurrence. 153 Under the CSA, the owner does not have to show
150. Id. The CLC has a corresponding provision where the owner can show
that the damage was actually the result of negligence on the part of the claimant.
Article III paragraph 3 states in relevant part:
3. If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or par-
tially either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by
the person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person,
the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such
person.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art. 111(3),
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 373, 374 (1970).
151. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(4) (1985) (Can.);
cf Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) (1994) (stating that the third party
cannot be an employee or agent under OPA; there is no such distinction made
under the CSA).
152. See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(A), (B).
153. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3)(1)(b) (stating
that if the occurrence is "wholly" caused by an act or omission of a third party, and
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evidence of due care or the taking of precautions for foreseeable
acts or omissions before asserting the defense. Under OPA, the
third party defense cannot be used if the act or omission was
caused by an agent or employee of the responsible party.154 The
CSA, however, does not have a corresponding limiting provision to
the third party defense. By using the term "solely," OPA provides
the defense as an all-or-nothing provision; but the CSA uses the
words "wholly" or "partially" and allows for proportional lowering
of the owner's liability. Both statutes allow for a third party de-
fense to liability, but it is clear from the language of the statutes
that OPA has a much higher standard to meet.' 55 These differing
provisions show OPA's tendency to give far less leeway when it
comes to asserting defenses, making the United States's oil pollu-
tion regime the strictest thus far.
The second difference is that the governmental defense does
not exist under OPA, but is available under the CSA. Under the
CSA, the owner of a ship can assert the governmental negligence
defense if the incident is wholly caused by the negligence of the
government or other authority responsible for maintaining naviga-
tional instruments used by ships.' 56 This means that if the inci-
dent is not the direct result of governmental negligence, then the
owner of the ship will be liable. Although the CSA requires the
owner to meet a stringent standard for this defense, in contrast, it
does not emphasize the hard line legislative stance taken by the
United States in the pursuit of adequate oil-pollution laws.
that third party intended to cause the occurrence, then the owner will be relieved
from liability).
154. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) (providing that the responsible party will not be
held liable if the oil spill was caused by an act or omission of a third party whose
act or omission is due to a contractual connection with the responsible party,
notwithstanding the fact that the responsible party have exercised due care and
took all reasonable precautions).
155. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) with R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3)(b).
Both statutes allow for the third party defense, although OPA requires the respon-
sible party to exercise due care and take foreseeable precautions. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 2703(a)(3)(A), (B). The CSA does not require the owner of the ship to show that
he exercised due care, or that he took precautions against foreseeable acts on the
part of any third party. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3).
156. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3)(1)(c) (allowing the owner to escape
liability for an oil spill if the incident was caused "wholly" by the negligence of the
Canadian government or an authority responsible for any sea going-navigational
devices).
19981 367
368 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:335
The third difference in the defenses to liability is that OPA
provides the responsible party with a defense for cases where the
claimant caused the incident by gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct.157 This defense will lower the liability to the extent that the
gross negligence or willful misconduct of the third party caused the
incident. Under the CSA, the owner of the ship must simply show
negligence on the part of the claimant, not gross negligence or wil-
ful misconduct.158 Even in the area of the defense against the ac-
tual claimant, OPA has a more difficult standard for the
responsible party to meet.159
The fourth difference in the defenses to liability is the exist-
ence of a contingency, a "takeaway" provision, that the responsible
party, under OPA, must meet before being afforded any of the com-
plete defenses.' 60 If this contingency is not met, then the responsi-
ble party's defenses and limits to liability are taken away.' 8 ' The
CSA does not include a corresponding "takeaway" provision. 162
Under OPA, if a responsible party fails to report the incident, fails
to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance, or refuses to
comply with safety standards, he will lose all of the complete de-
fenses provided in section 2703(a).163 This provision implies that
regardless of whether the "responsible party" can show that a third
party was the actual responsible party, or even that the cause of
the spill was from the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the
claimant, the prevention and most efficient clean up of the spills is
157. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (negating liability of the responsible party if the
oil spill was caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of particular
claimants).
158. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(4)(a), (b) (stating that if the oil spill was
the result of an act or omission or the negligence of those who suffered the injury,
then the owner will be held liable proportionately to his fault).
159. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(b). § 2703 states in relevant part that:
"A responsible party is not liable under section 2702 of this title to a claimant,
to the extent that the incident is caused by the gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct of the claimant." Id. The CSA has no corresponding requirement. See Can-
ada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3) (1985) (Can.).
160. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
161. See id.
162. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3). The lack of the CSA's attention to the
prevention of oil pollution is in stark contrast to the provisions of OPA. Because
there is no specific language in the CSA addressing prevention of oil pollution, one
can infer that prevention of oil spills is not one of the government's main concerns.
163. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), (2), and (3) (illustrating that the responsible
party is required to meet the most basic of precautionary measures to be afforded
the complete defenses).
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OPA's main priority. Although the CSA has followed a more uni-
form international approach, it seems to allow leniency in an area
of maritime oil pollution that should require the most stringent
standards. The governmental defense, lesser standards in the
area of third party liability and the lack of preventive require-
ments make the CSA a far less stringent legal regime than that
enacted by the United States.
C. Limits to Liability
1. Limits to Liability Under OPA
OPA has enacted a provision, section 2704, to limit the liabil-
ity amount of the responsible party. 64 This provision dramati-
cally increased the limitation values from preceding legislation. 165
164. See id. § 2704(a). Section 2704(a) states in relevant part:
(a) General rule
Except as otherwise provided in this section ... [total liability] with re-
spect to each incident shall not exceed -
(1) for a tank vessel, [except a tank vessel on which the only oil carried as
cargo is an animal fat or vegetable oil, as those terms are used in § 2720 of
this title] the greater of -
(A) $1,200 per gross ton; or
(B)(i) in the case of a vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons, $10,000,000; or
(ii) in the case of a vessel of 3,000 gross tons or less, $2,000,000;
(2) for any other vessel, $600 per gross ton or $500,000, whichever is
greater;
(3) for an offshore facility except a deepwater port, the total of all removal
costs plus $75,000,000; and
(4) for any onshore facility and a deepwater port, $350,000,000.
Id.
Under OPA, a 150,000 ten tank vessel would have a limit of liability of
$180,000,000 ($1,200 x 150,000=$180 million). A 2,500 ton tank vessel would have
a limit of liability of $3,000,000 ($1,200 x 2,500=$3 million). For a 20,000 ton non-
tank vessel, the limit of liability would be $12,000,000 ($600 x 20,000=$12 million).
Congress devised different limits of liability for non-tank vessels because they are
less likely to cause an oil spill of a disastrous magnitude. See id; see also Millard,
supra note 4, at 331 (discussing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and some of the
reasons behind its enactment).
165. 33 U.S.C. § 2704; cf 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1). The FWPCA's § 1321(f)(1),
(2), and (3) state in relevant part that:
(0 Liability for actual costs of removal
(1) Except where an owner or operator can prove that a discharge was
caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the
part of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third
party without regard to whether any such act or omission was or was not
negligent, or any combination of the foregoing clauses, such owner or op-
erator of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged
370 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:335
The limits on liability were increased because of the apparent in-
adequacies that were in place at the time of OPA's enactment. 166
Thus, the increased limits on liability do nothing but benefit the
responsible party, especially in light of a large-scale oil spill like
the Exxon Valdez. Liability limits are necessary in this type of in-
dustry because of the potential for a large-scale oil spill. To benefit
from these limitations, the responsible party must meet limitation
requirements. However, as long as limits, whether increased or
not, are in place, the responsible party will never be liable for the
full amount of damages. 167
in violation of subsection (b)(3) of this section shall, notwithstanding any
other provision of law, be liable to the United States Government for the
actual costs incurred under subsection (c) of this section for the removal of
such oil or substance by the United States Government in an amount not
to exceed, in the case of an inland oil barge $125 per gross ton of such
barge, or $125,000, whichever is greater, and in the case of any other ves-
sel, $150 per gross ton of such vessel (or, for a vessel carrying oil or haz-
ardous substances as cargo, $250,000), whichever is greater, except that
where the United States can show that such discharge was the result of
willful negligence or willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge
of the owner, such owner or operator shall be liable to the United States
Government for the full amount of such costs ...
(2) . .. [Such owner or operator [of an onshore facility] ... shall ... be
liable to the United States Government for the actual costs incurred
under subsection (c) of this section for the removal of such oil or substance
by the United States Government in an amount not to exceed
$50,000,000, except that where the United States can show that such dis-
charge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within
the privity an knowledge of the owner, such owner or operator shall be
liable to the United States Government for the full amount of such costs
(3) ... [Such owner or operator [of an offshore facility] ... shall ... be
liable to the United States Government for the actual costs incurred
under subsection (c) of this section for the removal of such oil or substance
by the United States Government in an amount not to exceed
$50,000,000, except that where the United States can show that such dis-
charge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within
the privity and knowledge of the owner, such owner or operator shall be
liable to the United States Government for the full amount of such costs.
Id.
166. Legislative history states, "[tihe [FWPCA] ... historically provided only
partial protection. The Act sets inappropriately low limits of liability for owners
and operators of vessels with respect to Federal oil spill removal costs and natural
damages, and provides no coverage or compensation for other damages." S. Rep.
No. 101-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N., 722, 724.
167. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1), (2).
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In all likelihood, an oil spill will occur, and the effect will be
that OPA will make the responsible party pay more money than
the owner under the CSA. The only time a responsible party will
not be able to limit liability is if it has not followed the safety proce-
dures, or if the spill was caused by an intentional act or omis-
sion.'68 The responsible party does pay more than under past
regimes, but he still will save tremendous amounts of money in the
event of a catastrophic oil spill.
Accompanying OPA's rising liability limits were some excep-
tions that could defeat the responsible party's ability to limit liabil-
ity. The limits on liability do not apply if the "incident was
proximately caused by [the] gross negligence or willful misconduct
of [the responsible party], or the violation of an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation by, the responsible
party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible
party...."-169 These precautionary measures are the same poten-
tial acts that could prevent a responsible party from accessing the
complete defenses to liability.170 Thus, a responsible party could
lose a complete defense and his ability to limit liability. These de-
fense restrictions, coupled with the added restrictions to the limi-
tations on liability, make OPA potentially the most costly and
domineering of all existing oil-pollution legislations. OPA requires
that the oil shipping industry take necessary precautions to avoid
a catastrophic spill. If these precautions are not taken, then the
responsible party will see OPA's costly outcome.
While a responsible party's acts could prevent him from limit-
ing liability, so too can the responsible party's refusal to act. If a
responsible party
fails or refuses (A) to report the incident as required by law
and the responsible party knows or has reason to know of the
incident; (B) to provide all reasonable cooperation and assist-
ance requested by a responsible official in connection with re-
moval activities; or (C) without sufficient cause, to comply
with an order issued under subsection (c) or (e) of section
1321 of this title[,]17 1
168. See id.
169. Id. § 2704(c)(1)(A), (B).
170. See supra note 140.
171. Id. § 2704(c)(2)(A), (B), and (C). 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) and (e) state in rele-
vant part:
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(c) Federal Removal Authority
(1) General Removal Requirement
(A) The President shall, in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan and any appropriate Area Contingency Plan, ensure effective and
immediate removal of a discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a sub-
stantial threat of a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance -
(i) into or on the navigable waters;
(ii) on the water adjoining shorelines to the navigable waters;
(iii) into or on the waters of the exclusive economic zone; or
(iv) that may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or
under the exclusive management authority of the United States.
(B) In carrying out this paragraph, the President may -
(i) remove or arrange for the removal of a discharge, and mitigate or pre-
vent a substantial threat of a discharge, at any time;
(ii) direct or monitor all Federal, State, and private actions to remove a
discharge; and
(iii) remove and, if necessary, destroy a vessel discharging, or threatening
to discharge, by whatever means are available.
(2) Discharge Posing Substantial Threat To Public Health Or Welfare
(A) If a discharge, or a substantial threat of a discharge, of oil or a haz-
ardous substance from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility is of
such a size or character as to be a substantial threat to the public health
or welfare of the United States (including but not limited to fish, shellfish,
wildlife, other natural resources, and the public and private beaches and
shorelines of the United States), the President shall direct all Federal,
State, and private actions to remove the discharge or to mitigate or pre-
vent the threat of the discharge.
(B) In carrying out this paragraph, the President may, without regard to
any other provision of law governing contracting procedures or employ-
ment of personnel by the Federal Government -
(i) remove or arrange for the removal of the discharge, or mitigate or pre-
vent the substantial threat of the discharge; and
(ii) remove and, if necessary, destroy a vessel discharging, or threatening
to discharge, by whatever means are available,
Id. § 1321(c)
(e) Civil Enforcement
(1) Orders Protecting Public Health
In addition to any action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial
threat to the public health or welfare of the United States, including fish,
shellfish, and wildlife, public and private property, shorelines, beaches,
habitat, and other living and nonliving natural resources under the juris-
diction or control of the United States, because of an actual or threatened
discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from a vessel or facility in viola-
tion of subsection (b) of this section, the President may-
(A) require the Attorney General to secure any relief from any person,
including the owner or operator of the vessel or facility, as may be neces-
sary to abate such endangerment; or
(B) after notice to the affected State, take any other action under this sec-
tion, including issuing administrative orders, that may be necessary to
protect the public health and welfare.
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then he will be unable to limit his liability. Additionally, section
1321 (c) and (e) refer to the President's post accident orders;172 if
the responsible party fails to comply with these orders, then he will
also be unable to limit liability. Section 2704(c) adds to the height-
ened congressional awareness of the need to prevent oil pollution,
thus attacking the acts of the responsible party prior to the oil spill
and taking away any privileges that were at one time available. 173
With such rigorous standards, Congress will accomplish its plan of
eliminating oil spills without serious regard to who is in the
way. 174
As a result of this legislation and the United States's failure to
ratify the Protocols, the concern arose that the oil industry would
evolve into a small-ship fleet industry. President George Bush ex-
pressed his concern prior to his signing into law H.R. 1465 (The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990). President Bush stated:
I am concerned about another consequence of the failure to
ratify the Protocols. We must work to ensure that, in re-
sponse to the provisions of this Act, a situation is not created
in which larger oil shippers seeking to avoid risk are replaced
by smaller companies with limited assets and reduced ability
to pay for the cleanup of oil spills. We will need to monitor
developments in order to protect against such undesirable
consequences.
The oil industry faces many new requirements as a result
of this legislation. These requirements include substantially
increased financial responsibility; preparation of contingency
plans; and the replacement of fleets with safer oil tankers. A
(2) Jurisdiction of district courts
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to grant
any relief under this subsection that the public interest and the equities of
the case may require.
Id. § 1321(e).
172. See id. § 1321(e).
173. See Chao, supra note 137, at 240.
The legislators believed that very high limits would serve to avoid pollu-
tion incidents, since in their eyes, 'Many in the industry seem to have
decided that it is cheaper to spill and pay for its clean up than it is to
prevent spil(1)s and develop effective techniques to contain them.' They
therefore increased the limits of liability in a spectacular way in the OPA.
Id. (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S.11537 (August 2, 1990)).
174. When President George Bush signed law H.R. 1465 (the "Oil Pollution Act
of 1990"), he endorsed the provisions of the Act, but not without voicing some con-
cerns. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 1465, 26
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. (August 27, 1990).
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balance has been sought to give the industry the flexibility to
meet the requirements of the Act without incurring excessive
costs. 1
7 5
If the oil industry decides to change its shipping tactics by in-
corporating smaller ships, it will not be liable for as large of a spill,
because smaller ships cannot spill a larger ship's quantity of oil.
The ships and their owners will still have to meet the pre-trans-
port requirements and the post-spill requirements in order to limit
liability. Therefore, using smaller ships will not effectively avoid
liability. Rather, that result will only be accomplished when ship-
owners take the appropriate precautionary measures prior to oil
transport.
On its face OPA does not appear to represent an unlimited
statutory regime, but the few provisions allowing for unlimited lia-
bility create a very real likelihood that unlimited liability can be-
come a reality. If the responsible party does not follow the
requirements in the Act, it will most surely have unlimited liabil-
ity. By not following the requisite safety measures, the responsible
party will lose its ability to limit liability.
2. Limits of Liability Under the CSA
Section 679 of the CSA, unlike OPA, still follows the fault and
privity test for the limitation of liability. 176 The CSA uses the fault
and privity test and assesses the fault percentages to the aggre-
gate amount of liability. 177 The owner will be liable for the amount
that he was at fault and any other party will be liable for the
amount that they were at fault. However, if the owner's liability
occurs without the owner's actual fault or privity, then the owner
gets the lesser of two amounts assessed as liability. 178 The CSA
175. Id.
176. See Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 679 (1985) (Can.).
177. See id.
178. See id. Section 679 states in relevant part:
(1) Where an occurrence giving rise to liability of an owner of a ship
under section 677 occurs without actual fault or privity of the owner, the
owner's maximum aggregate liability under that section in respect of that
occurrence is the lesser of
(a) one hundred and thirty-three Special Drawing Rights for each
(i) ton of the ship's tonnage, where paragraph (2)(a) applies, or
(ii) tonne of the Convention ship's tonnage, where paragraph (2)(b) ap-
plies, and
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and the CLC 179 both apply the fault and privity standard, thus
(b) fourteen million Special Drawing Rights, and section 575 does not ap-
ply in respect of the owner's liability for the matters referred to in subsec-
tion 677(1).
(2) For the purposes of subparagraphs (1)(a)(i) and (ii),
(a) a ship's tonnage is the aggregate of
(i) its net tonnage, and
(ii) the amount deducted from its gross tonnage in respect of engine room
space for the purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage; or
(b) where a Convention ship's tonnage cannot be measured in accordance
with paragraph
(a), it shall be deemed to be 39.368 per cent of the weight in tonnes of oil
that the Convention ship is capable of carrying.
(3) In subsection (2), "net tonnage" means register tonnage.
(4) In paragraphs (1)(a) and (b), "Special Drawing Rights" means special
drawing rights issued by the International Monetary Fund.
Id.
Under the Canada Shipping Act, a 150,000 ton ship would have a limit of liability
of 19,950,000 Special Drawing Rights (133 Special Drawing Rights x
150,000=19,950,000 Special Drawing Rights). A 2,500 ton ship would have a limit
of liability of 332,500 Special Drawing Rights (133 Special Drawing Rights x
2,500=332,500 Special Drawing Rights). These numbers are the same for a "ship"
and a "Convention ship." See id.; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
179. The corresponding provision of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention is Arti-
cle V which has been amended by Article 6 of the 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liabil-
ity Convention which states:
1. The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this
Convention in respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calcu-
lated as follows:
(a) 3 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of
tonnage;
(b) for a ship with tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional unit of
tonnage, 420 units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-
paragraph (a);
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event ex-
ceed 59.7 million units of account.
2. The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Conven-
tion if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal
act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or reck-
lessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.
3. For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of the limitation pro-
vided for in paragraph 1 of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund
for the total sum constituting the limit of his liability with the Court or
other competent authority of any one of the Contracting States in which
action is brought under Article IX or, if no action is brought, with any
Court or other competent authority in any one of the Contracting States
in which an action can be brought under Article IX. The fund can be con-
stituted either by depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or
other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State
where the fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court
or other competent authority.
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providing uniformity in the limitations available to the owner of a
convention ship or any other ship. The CSA and the CLC both
have similar provisions where the negligence of the ship owner will
prevent the ability to limit liability. 180 There is no other method of
restricting the ship owner's limitation on liability other than the
fault and privity standard,' 8 ' because there are no other methods
listed in the CSA.
Section 679 of the CSA seems more dismissive than any of the
previous sections. Unlike OPA, section 679 does not require the
owner of a ship, whether it be a "ship" or a "Convention ship," to
meet any of the safety standards prior to an oil spill. Also, the
owner does not have to show that he took precautions from foresee-
able risk. CSA section 679 fails to address the area of prevention
or implement specific guidelines that ship owners must follow prior
to carrying oil. The CSA appears to dismiss the idea of oil-spill
prevention altogether.
3. Comparison of the Limits on Liability Between OPA and
the CSA
Both the Oil Pollution Act and the Canada Shipping Act pro-
vide for the limitation of liability for vessel owners and responsible
parties involved in oil-pollution damage. Both statutes contain
provisions that can either take away, entirely or partially, the pos-
sibility of limitation, if certain criteria are not met. OPA, however,
has taken a much more aggressive stance than the CSA when ad-
dressing the area of liability limitation.
Under OPA, the responsible party's acts are much more
closely scrutinized and can have a significant effect on whether the
responsible party will be afforded liability limitation. If the re-
sponsible party engages in conduct classified as gross negligence or
4. The fund shall be distributed among the claimants in proportion to the
amounts of their established claims.
5. If before the fund is distributed the owner or any of his servants or
agents or any person providing him insurance or other financial security
has, as a result of the incident in question, paid compensation for pollu-
tion damage, such person shall, up to the amount he has paid, acquire by
subrogation the rights which the person so compensated would have en-
joyed under this Convention.
Id.
180. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 679; cf International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Art. VI(2), Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, re-
printed in 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 373, 374 (1970).
181. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 679 (1985) (Can.).
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willful misconduct, then he will not be afforded the right to limita-
tion.'8 2 Under the CSA and the CLC, it appears that the acts of
the registered owner are the main concern of the statute; the fault
and privity standard, when applied to these actions, will only de-
feat liability limitation if the registered owner's acts were negli-
gent. Both statutes have placed a premium on the acts of the liable
party surrounding an oil spill, as well they should.
OPA continues with its theme of strictness toward the bulk
transport of oil by vessels, having additional provisions forfeiting
the limitations of liability if the responsible party does not perform
certain duties.'8 3 For example, if the responsible party fails to
comply with the applicable federal standards for construction,
safety and operation, then such party loses the ability to limit lia-
bility.'8 4 Another provision that exists under OPA, but not in
either the CSA or the CLC, concerns the possibility that the re-
sponsible party will lose the chance to limit liability for failing to
report the spill of oil, or failing to provide reasonable cooperation
and assistance regarding cleanup.' 8 5 None of these areas of oil pol-
lution prevention are addressed in either the CSA or the CLC. The
OPA provisions further illustrate that the United States's purpose
in enacting oil-pollution legislation was to have adequate laws to
cope with a devastating oil spill, as well as an incentive to all in the
oil-carriage business to take the necessary precautions to avoid a
spill of great magnitude.
Through OPA, the United States, in theory, has enacted a 'uni-
form' law for oil pollution damage, rendering OPA's section 2718
182. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A).
183. See id. § 2704(c)(1), (2).
184. See id. § 2704(c)(1)(B). The strictness of this provision becomes extremely
apparent because the responsible party can forfeit the possibility of limiting liabil-
ity. The actions of an agent or employee of the responsible party can also thwart
the ability to limit liability. A responsible party can forfeit limited liability due to
the conduct of a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the re-
sponsible party. See id.
185. See id. § 2704(c)(2)(A), (B). Under the CSA and the CLC, it appears that a
ship owner could actually fail to report a spill or assist in the cleanup, and still be
able to have a number defenses available. Furthermore, the shipowner may still
be able to limit liability. Even failing to meet the proper regulations and safety
standards is not addressed in the CSA and the CLC. One can imply that the owner
would still be able to limit liability if the omission or act of violating these stan-
dards did not cause the damage.
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somewhat confusing.' 8 6 Section 2718 allows the individual states
to enact their own oil-pollution liability, destroying OPA's uniform-
186. Potentially one of the most notable, and without doubt one of the most
financially eye catching provisions of OPA is § 2718. Section 2718 states in rele-
vant part:
Section 2718. Relationship to other law
(a) Preservation of State authorities; Solid Waste Disposal Act.
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 [The Limitation of Liabil-
ity Act] shall-
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to-
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such discharge; or
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.) or State law, including common law.
(b) Preservation of State funds.
Nothing in this Act or in section 9509 of title 26 shall in any way affect, or
be construed to affect, the authority of any State-
(1) to establish, or to continue in effect, a fund any purpose of which is to
pay for costs or damages arising out of, or directly resulting from, oil pol-
lution or the substantial threat of oil pollution; or
(2) to require any person to contribute to such a fund.
Id. § 2718.
This section illustrates that individual states that share coastline with Can-
ada and are affected by a trans-coastal oil spill, also have enacted legislation that
will affect the outcome of liability and any possible limitations on liability. It be-
comes clear after reading this provision that if a responsible party is successful in
his ability to limit liability according to § 2704, § 2718 allows the individual states
to impose their individual liability standards and are not preempted by either OPA
or federal authority. 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
Several states have enacted liability regimes that apply to vessels involved in
the carriage of oil. A few of the states that have enacted legislation that would
affect both the United States and Canada are New York, Washington, Maine, and
Alaska. Washington, Maine and Alaska have not invoked limitation of liability
provisions, creating an even greater incentive for bulk oil carriers to insure the
safe transport of the oil. New York has adopted a strict liability regime for all
cleanup and removal costs no matter who sustains them. See N.Y. Nay. Law
§ 181.1 (McKinney 1997). New York does place limits on liability for damage
caused by an oil spill, but "[t]he liability limits established... shall not be consid-
ered to increase the liability above the federal limits for tank vessels or vessels as
defined in the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990." Id. § 181.3(b). However, § 181.4
states that "[a]n act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage, or governmental
negligence shall be the only defenses which may be raised by any owner or opera-
tor of a major facility or vessel responsible for a discharge in any action arising
under the provisions of this article." Id. § 181.4. These limitations, although simi-
lar, are not as extensive as the limitations afforded by OPA.
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ity.187 It seems difficult to fathom that Congress, while trying to
create a uniform law, would actually include a provision such as
section 2718.188 Every state could possibly enact their own oil-pol-
lution legislation, establishing differing standards for liability,
thereby increasing the confusion surrounding a trans-territorial
spill. Section 2718 more or less does away with the need to have a
limitation of liability provision at all, as the states themselves
could enact an unlimited-liability provision to protect themselves
from potential pollution damage. The responsible party may be
able to meet the requirements for limitation under OPA, but then
become bootstrapped by a state legislation that, in a sense, creates
unlimited liability.
The CSA does not have a provision analogous to OPA's section
2718. Therefore, the "fault and privity" test illustrated in section
679 of the CSA is the governing rule for limitation purposes.' 8 9
The existing differences in the limitation provisions of OPA and
the CSA will create havoc in the determination of liability. Inevi-
tably, there will exist a scenario where a vessel owner will be in-
volved in a spill resulting in damage to both of these neighboring
countries. Because of the differences in limitation regimes, the
owner could be subject to unlimited liability regardless of fault
under OPA. Additionally, section 2718 would subject the owner to
state-imposed liability. At the same time, in Canada, under the
"fault and privity" test his liability will be limited considerably.
187. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718. For a favorable look at the enactment of OPA, and
namely the existence of § 2718, see Mitchell, supra note 6, at 250-51.
The resulting Oil Pollution Act of 1990 offers an effective federal and state
liability system to prevent spills by inducing a high standard of care for
all persons engaged in the handling and transporting of oil. This system
ensures as much as possible that the polluter-not the American tax-
payer-pays for the cleanup costs and damages that result from spills.
Id. at 251.
188. The long-standing policy in environmental laws of not preempting
State authority and recognizing the rights of States to determine for
themselves the best way in which to protect their citizens, is clearly af-
firmed .... This subsection reinforces the position stated clearly else-
where that no aspect of State oil spill programs is preempted, including
the authority to impose additional requirements or penalties.
S. Rep. No. 101-94, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.AA.N. 722, 739-40.
189. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 679; Popp, supra note 9, at 120 (discussing
the difference between OPA § 2718 and the "fault and privity" test incorporated by
the CSA).
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The conflict between the two regimes creates a sense of urgency as
to which forum to choose, if that is a viable option.' 90
190. Under the current regimes, the claims brought for oil pollution damage
cannot be consolidated. OPA seems to apply only to oil spill damages that occur in
the United States. There is a question as to whether one would be able to bring
claims under OPA for damages caused by a United States vessel on Canadian soil.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2707. There is an exception under OPA that states that if the
country claiming the oil spill damage has a treaty or executive agreement with the
United States providing reciprocal treatment in the event that the United States
was damaged, then the damaged party may bring their claim. See id. § 2707(1)(B).
However, the United States and Canada, at this time, are not a part of a treaty or
executive agreement as stated in OPA.
The Canada Shipping Act has a similar provision that does not allow claims to
be brought when the damage is not caused in Canada by ships however defined.
Section 675 of the CSA states in relevant part:
675. (1) For ships other than Convention ships, this Part applies in re-
spect of actual or anticipated pollution damage
(a) in any place in Canada,
(b) in Canadian waters, and
(c) in any fishing zone of Canada prescribed pursuant to the Territorial
Sea and Fishing Zones Act, except where the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act applies, irrespective of the location of actual or expected dis-
charge of the pollutant and irrespective of the location where any
preventive measures are taken.
(2) For Convention ships, this Part applies, subject to subsection (3), in
respect of actual or anticipated oil pollution damage
(a) in any place in Canada,
(b) in Canadian waters, and
(c) on the territory or in the territorial sea of a state other than Canada
that is a party to the Civil Liability Convention, irrespective of the loca-
tion of the actual or expected discharge of the oil and irrespective of the
location where any preventive measures are taken.
Id. § 675.
The Canada Shipping Act also has a separate provision, § 680, that addresses
the oil spill damage caused by a Convention ship. See id.
Section 680 of the CSA states in relevant part:
680. Where an occurrence giving rise to liability of an owner of a Conven-
tion ship under section 677 does not result in any oil pollution damage on
the territory of Canada or in Canadian waters and no costs ... are in-
curred in respect of actual or anticipated oil pollution damage on the terri-
tory of Canada or in Canadian waters, no action may be commenced in
any court in Canada in relation to that occurrence in respect of matters
referred to in subsection 677(1).
Id. § 680.
This provision allows for claims to be instituted only if the damage was evidenced
in Canada. The presence of these corresponding provisions under OPA and the
CSA means that the parties involved in the oil pollution damage will be forced to
bring claims in multiple jurisdictions, having varying standards, with the possibil-
ity of inconsistent judgements for the same oil spill.
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III. A TRANS-TERRITORIAL OIL SPILL
A. Analysis of the Potential Conflicts Between OPA and the CSA
1. The OPA Claim
A 150,000 ton barge is under tow on the St. Lawrence River.
Because of the river's narrowness, the barge needs maneuvering
assistance from a tug boat. The barge crashes into an out-cropping
of rock, protruding from one of the thousands of islands along the
river. As a result, the barge is severely damaged and begins to
leak oil. The crash and the spillage is a result of the tug boat's
negligence. The oil spill caused extensive damage to both the
United States and Canada.
The owner of the barge is considered the responsible party for
purposes of OPA191 because the owner was responsible for the ves-
sel at the time the oil was discharged. 192 Under OPA, the respon-
sible party will be susceptible to actions brought by the United
States, a State, an Indian Tribe, or any persons damaged by the
spill. 19 3 Also included under the potential guise of responsible
party will be the tug, whose negligence caused the oil spill. 194
In order to escape liability for the damages, the owner of the
barge must assert one of the complete defenses. 195 Because the
spill was not caused by an act of God or act of war, the only possi-
ble remaining complete defense is third party negligence. 196 The
responsible party will have to show by a preponderance of the evi-
191. See supra note 104. Although the intent of Congress was to expand the
liability for oil pollution damage past the owner and operator of the vessel, section
2701(32)(A) does not expressly do so. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A). It seems on the
surface that the classification of "responsible party" only expanded the liable party
from "owner or operator" to the "owner, operator, or demise charterer." See id.
The idea of trying to have the oil companies be included in the definition of respon-
sible party was lost in the drafting of OPA and section 2701(32)(A). See Kopec &
Peterson, supra note 10, at 618 n.130.
192. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) (defining responsible party).
193. See id. § 2702(b)(1)(A), (B). Under section 2701, "'claimant' means any
person or government who presents a claim for compensation under this sub-
chapter." Id. § 2701(4). The responsible party is liable for removal costs and dam-
ages. Damages consist of natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence
use, revenues, profits and earning capacity, and public services. See id.
§ 2702(2)(A)-(F).
194. See id. § 2702(d)(1)(A).
195. See id. § 2703(a) (including defenses of an act of God, act of war, or an act
or omission on the part of a third party).
196. See id. § 2703(a)(3).
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dence that the acts of the tug boat solely caused the damages that
resulted from the oil discharge. 197 At the same time the barge
owner is asked to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
exercised due care with respect to the oil concerned and that he
took all precautions against the third party's foreseeable act.198 If
he is unable to do so, the barge owner cannot assert the third party
defense.
The responsible party will have difficulty proving the third
party defense. Section 2703 contains contractual-relationship lan-
guage requiring the responsible party to prove that the act or omis-
sion was not caused by "an employee or agent of the responsible
party or a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection
with the responsible party (except where the sole contractual ar-
rangement arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier
by rail) . . -99 Courts have found that even some tenuous rela-
tionships may classify as contractual relationships.2°° In the case
of the barge operator and the tug boat, a court would likely find a
contractual relationship and deny the use of the third party
defense. 20 '
The lone remaining defense available to the responsible party
is a specific defense against the actual claimant for gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct. 20 2 This exceptional defense is only ap-
plicable to particular claimants.20 3 The barge owner/operator can
assert this defense if he can show that the tug boat acted in a
grossly negligent manner, causing the oil spill.204 If established,
the responsible party escapes liability.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id. § 2703(a)(3).
200. See generally International Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund,
903 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that a contractual relationship existed
between an operator of a naval vessel and a fuel terminal where the actual spill
occurred, disallowing the operator's assertion of the third party defense).
201. Assume, arguendo, that the court found that the barge and tug did not
have a contractual relationship, as classified under OPA. Section 2703(c) limits
the responsible party's right to the defense if he fails to report the incident, pro-
vide reasonable cooperation, or comply with an order from the proper authorities.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(c). If our barge owner/operator failed to assist in the cleanup,
he would not have any defense for the discharge of the oil.
202. See id. § 2703(b).
203. See id.
204. See id.
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If the owner/operator of the barge is unable to prove any of
OPA's complete defenses, he is still entitled to limit the amount of
liability according to section 2704.205 Under this provision, how-
ever, the owner/operator/responsible party of the barge could see a
shift from limited liability to unlimited liability. An act of gross
negligence or willful misconduct on his part will force the responsi-
ble party to forgo his opportunity to limit liability.20 6 Failing to
report the discharge of oil, provide reasonable cooperation at
cleanup and comply with an order from the proper authorities will
also defeat the limitation of liability.20 7 Thus, if the responsible
party fails to meet these criteria, then the doctrine of unlimited
liability will become a reality for the careless barge owner.
In the event that the barge owner can assert a complete de-
fense, the tug boat owner/operator will be liable for the damages
caused by the oil spill, barring his application of any of the de-
fenses under OPA. In the event that the court sustains none of the
defenses, the owner/operator will be able to limit liability according
to the amount in carriage.208 Even after dealing with the OPA
claim, however, the responsible party may suffer further liability.
Individual states, which have enacted liability provisions greater
than those under OPA, could potentially bring separate claims.209
Additionally, the responsible party may have to adjudicate any
claims brought as a result of damages caused to Canadian soil, due
to the fact that OPA does not authorize the consolidation of
claims.210
2. The CSA Claim
Under the CSA, there is no question that the liable party will
be the registered owner of the barge.211 Because Canada has sus-
tained damage, the claimant 212 can bring suit in a Canadian
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
206. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (limiting liability).
207. See id.
208. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 186.
210. See 33 U.S.C. § 2707 (discussing recovery by foreign claimants); see also
R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 680 (restricting suits in Canada to situations involving
actual injury to Canadian territories).
211. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 673.
212. "'[Oil pollution damage' means, in relation to any ship, loss or damage
outside the ship caused by the contamination resulting from the discharge of oil
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court. 2 13 The fact that the spill was partially caused by the negli-
gence of the tug boat will be a factor to consider under the fault
and privity standard.214
Under the CSA, the owner of the barge is afforded a few more
complete defenses to liability than in the subsequent claim brought
under OPA. Since an act of war, or a natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable or irresistible character did not cause the
spill, the owner cannot use any of these as a defense.215
The third party defense is assertable only if the barge owner
can prove that the spill was wholly caused by an act or omission of
the tug boat with the intent to cause the damage.216 The fact that
the barge and the tug boat are in a contractual relationship does
not matter for purposes of the CSA's third party defense. Realisti-
cally, the barge owner will have a difficult time proving this de-
fense. First, he must show that the spill was caused wholly2 17 by
the tug boat driver. Second, the barge owner must prove that the
tug boat driver had the intent to cause damage. If these criteria
are not met, the third party-complete defense will fail.
The barge owner also has the defense of governmental negli-
gence, in the likelihood that a governmental authority failed in its
responsibility to maintain lights or necessary navigational instru-
ments. 218 When asserting the governmental defense, the barge
owner must show that the spill was "wholly" caused by the negli-
gence or wrongful act of any governmental authority. Although
this defense is available under the CSA, the barge owner cannot
use the defense successfully because of the limiting use of the term
"wholly."219
The CSA, like OPA, also provides a defense against the claim-
ant who was damaged in the oil spill.220 If the barge owner can
prove that the claimant wholly or partially caused the occurrence,
from that ship." Id. Damages under the CSA are defined throughout the various
provisions of the Act. See id. §§ 677-678.
213. See id. § 675.
214. See id. § 677(3).
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. "Wholly" is defined as "to the full or entire extent, without diminution or
reduction: altogether, completely, totally." Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary 2612 (3d ed. 1986).
218. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 677(3)(c).
219. See supra note 146.
220. See id. § 677(4)(a), (b).
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or intentionally or negligently caused the damage, the barge owner
can reduce liability proportionally.221 This appears to be a very
limited defense on the part of the Canadian regime and, in a sense,
has changed the statute's standard from strict to a more fault-
based liability.222 Unless the barge owner can show that the
claimant wholly caused the occurrence, this provision seems use-
less as a complete defense. If the claimant's acts or omissions only
partially cause the occurrence, then the CSA will follow a fault-
based comparative negligence standard and not strict liability.223
Thus, the CSA provides the barge owner with more of a limitation
to liability than an actual complete defense.
The court will subject the barge owner to the fault and privity
standard at the point when it will assess the possible limitation of
liability.224 If the barge owner can show that the spill giving rise
to his liability occurred without his actual fault or privity, the
owner will be held liable for the lesser of the established statutory
amounts. 225 The barge owner will be able to limit liability regard-
less of whether he has taken the necessary preventative measures
to avoid the occurrence of the oil spill.226 Thus, the more lenient
CSA provisions regarding oil-pollution prevention diverge from
OPA's more stringent requirements.
In Canada, it appears as if the barge owner will be limited to
suit only under the provisions of the CSA. Unlike section 2718 of
OPA, nowhere in the CSA does it state that the individual prov-
inces may enact their own oil-spill legislation. 227 Therefore, the
221. See id.
222. See id. § 679(3).
223. See id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "comparative negligence" as "negli-
gence . . . measured in terms of percentage, and any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to the person for
whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought." Black's Law Dictionary 282
(6th ed. 1990).
224. See R.S.C., 3d Supp., ch. 6, § 679. The fault and privity standard used
under the CSA for the assessment of liability limitation is significantly different
than the corresponding OPA provision for limiting liability. See supra notes 102
and 108 and accompanying text. These differing provisions could result in differ-
ent judgments in the different countries, even though the facts may be the same.
225. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
227. Suit, under OPA, could include the possibility of claims brought under the
individual states' statutes, as well as claims brought under common law maritime
theories.
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barge owner can expect all Canadian liability to come from one
CSA action.
Under the CSA, the standards for liability are lower, the limits
on liability are less stringent and there are more defenses avail-
able to the liable party. There is no corresponding provision to im-
pose unlimited liability, thus, making the CSA a more lenient
regime toward the shipping industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the most recent amend-
ments to the Canada Shipping Act have complicated the response
to and compensation for a large trans-territorial oil spill. Instead
of being the most comprehensive oil pollution legislation enacted,
the Oil Pollution Act has done nothing more than add to the confu-
sion of an already existing patchwork of oil pollution legislation.
At the same time, the amendments to the Canada Shipping Act fail
to cure the inadequacies apparent in the international commu-
nity's oil-pollution "solution." The probability of a single oil spill
causing damage to both Canada and the United States is practi-
cally inevitable; thus, without more uniform legislation, the re-
sponse and compensation process will be long and arduous.
The differing liability standards, defenses to liability and limi-
tations to liability reveal that the potential for inconsistent judg-
ments, flowing from these two competing regimes, are inevitable.
Since the idea for oil-pollution legislation uniformity is of particu-
lar importance to these two countries, it is hard to fathom how
these countries cannot come to terms with a consolidated approach
to these potential trans-territorial oil spills. As history has shown,
these countries are more apt to use the existing legislative regimes
until their inadequacies become harsh reality. However, it may
not take a catastrophe the size of the Exxon Valdez to confirm that
these competing regimes are too irreconcilable to efficiently cope
with a trans-territorial oil spill.
Tyler J. Savage
